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Gifts by living individuals account for the lion’s share of charitable contri- 
butions in the United States. Accordingly, the present examination of the 
effect of taxes on contributions begins by considering just such contribu- 
tions.  Section 2.1  provides some statistical background  by  tracing the 
growth of  individual contributions over time and describing its distribu- 
tion by various characteristics. Section 2.2 provides a brief description of 
the provisions of the tax law affecting charitable contributions. The next 
section discusses the theoretical analysis of the effect of income tax provi- 
sions on contributions within a standard economic model of  individual 
behavior. The implications of alternative behavioral assumptions are also 
considered. Section 2.4 describes the data, estimation methods, and basic 
results of econometric studies of giving by individuals. In discussing both 
the theoretical and empirical models, the effects of  the tax-defined price 
of giving and net income are afforded special attention. And section 2.5 
continues this discussion by focusing on particular issues of behavior and 
estimation technique arising from this work. The final section discusses 
econometric work on  the effect of tax policy on charitable giving for other 
countries. Discussion of the implications for tax policy of observed giving 
behavior is deferred to chapter 3. 
2.1  The Size and Distribution of Individual Contributions 
As in all other areas of empirical study, our knowledge about the mag- 
nitude of charitable contributions is limited by the availability and quality 
of data on the subject. If one accepts the definition of contributions in the 
tax law-gifts  to certain nonprofit organizations, but not direct gifts to 
other individuals-contributions  may readily be measured for taxpayers 
who itemize their deductions. For households who do not itemize their de- 
16 17  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
ductions, however, information on giving is rarely available. In order to 
give a general idea of the magnitude of contributions over time in the 
United States, table 2.1 presents estimates from three sources. Although 
the series shows that these appear to  be roughly comparable to each other, 
there is considerable variation in the methodologies that have been used to 
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Table 2.1  (continued) 
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Sources: Col. (l), estimates by F. Emerson Andrews, given in Kahn 1960, p. 63, table 16; 
col. (2), Giving U.S.A.  1982, p. 34; col. (3), 1929-38: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960, p. 
139; 1939-81: U.S.  Council of Economic Advisers 1983, p. 185; col. (3,  Nelson 1977b, p. 
131. 
estimate total giving.' Thus care should be taken in interpreting these fig- 
ures. The two basic sets of estimates from Andrews (Kahn 1960) and the 
American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel's Giving U.S.A.,  suggest 
that contributions have risen in relation to personal income between 1929 
and 1981. As a percentage of  personal income, contributions have in- 
creased from about 1.3 to 1.8 percent over the period. Despite this overall 
increase in the average contribution rate, the trend since 1970 has been 
negative, with the ratio falling from a peak of 1.96 in 1970 and 1971 to 
1.84in 1980and 1981.2 
At any one time, contribution levels obviously vary among individuals. 
Not surprisingly, they vary markedly by income level. Table 2.2 gives re- 
1. For discussions of  methodologies used in estimating contributions by individuals, see 
2. The shorter series on  contributions produced by Nelson implies that the ratio of contri- 
Kahn (1960, chap. 4), Dickinson (1970), and Nelson (1977a). 
butions to personal income fell throughout the 1960-72 period, from 1.96 to 1.66. 19  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Table 2.2  Average Contributions by Household Income, 1973 
Average 
Contributions as 
Income  Income  Contributions  Average Income 
Average  Average  Percentage of 
Under $4,000  $  1,942  $  75  3.9 
$4,OOo-7,999  5,906  122  2.  I 
$8,000-9,999  8,974  208  2.3 
$10,000-  14,999  12,365  327  2.6 
$15,000-  19,999  17,191  523  3  .O 
$2O,OOo-29,999  23,685  720  3  .O 
$30,000-49,999  36,174  1,455  4.0 
$50,000-99,999  66,004  5,552  8.4 
$100,000-  199,999  130,363  16,988  13.0 
$200,000-499,999  280,255  38,950  13.9 
$500,000  or more  1,008,653  70,501  7.0 
All  $  10,251  $  459  4.5 
Sources: Average income: US.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1973.  Indi- 
vidual Income Tax Returns  1976,  p. 7;  average contributions: Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 
1977,~.  161,  table I. 
sults taken from the National Study of Philanthropy, a survey taken in 
1974 covering contributions in 1973. The table shows that average contri- 
butions rose monotonically with income, from $75 for households in the 
lowest income group to over $70,000 for households with incomes over 
$500,000. The percentage of income contributed also rose with income be- 
tween $4000 and $500,000. The ratio falls with income at the lowest in- 
come levels, which agrees with similar tabulations using other data.  Fig- 
ure 2.1 uses data for itemized deductions to plot the relationship between 
income and the proportion of  income contributed.  In each case, a U- 
shaped curve is evident over some range.4 
It may be tempting to make conclusions, using information on the cor- 
relation between contributions and income, about the income elasticity of 
individual contributions. For example, one might conclude from the rise 
in the contributions-to-income ratio since 1929 that contributions have an 
elasticity greater than one. This reasoning may yield incorrect conclu- 
sions, however. Unlike the determination of  the income elasticity for a 
consumer good where the price of the good is constant, the tax-defined net 
price of giving created by the charitable deduction typically varies over 
time and among income classes. In addition, taxes affect the amount of 
disposable income available after taxes. Indeed, one of the principal ob- 
3. See, for example, Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981,  p. 406). 
4. For further discussion of this U-shaped relationship, see Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981, 
pp. 405-7). Among the possible factors in explaining the U-shape, the high proportion  of 
older individuals, whose wealth is high relative to their incomes, may be important. 20  Contributions by Individuals 
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jectives of  the econometric analysis of charitable contributions has been 
to determine the independent effect of taxes. 
The examination of average contributions masks significant variability 
in contributions among households of  a given income level. Tables 2.3 
and 2.4, which show the distribution of giving in relation to income, indi- 
cate substantial inequality in personal propensities to make contributions. 
Grouping households according to the proportion of their gross income 
contributed makes it clear that households earning a relatively small por- 
tion of total income account for a disproportionate share of contribu- 
tions. Table 2.3, based on survey data for 1973 covering itemizers and 
nonitemizers alike, shows that households contributing more than 20 per- 
cent of their income accounted for about 11 percent of income but over 60 
percent of all contributions. At the other end, households accounting for 
55 percent of income gave only 8 percent of  all gifts. Table 2.4 presents 
similar data based on tax returns for itemizers only. It shows that there is 21  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
considerably more equality in propensities to contribute among itemizing 
taxpayers only than among all households.  Itemizing taxpayers with 2 
percent of the total income made about 21 percent of all contributions for 
this group. At the lower end, taxpayers with 62 percent of income gave 
only about 17 percent of  all gifts. There is, then, considerable variation 
Table 2.3  Distribution of Contributions  and Income, 1973 
Weighted Cumulative Distribution 
Unweighted 
Contributions  as  Number of 















































Source: Tabulations from the National Study of Philanthropy. See Morgan, Dye, and Hy- 
bels 1977 for a description of this data set. 
Note: Intervals include the upper limit. 




of AGI  Returns  Adjusted Gross Income  Contributions 
0  12.5  6.2  0.0 
0-2  62.6  61.9  16.7 
2-4  80.8  81 .o  34.1 
4-6  87.2  87.7  44.9 
6-8  91.2  91.6  53.7 
8-10  93.7  93.9  60.5 
10-15  97.0  96.9  12.4 
15-20  98.1  98.0  78.7 
20-30  99.1  99.0  86.1 
30-50  99.8  99.8  96.0 
Greater than 50  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Unpublished tabulations, based on 1983 tax model, Office of Tax Analysis, 10 De- 
cember 1984. 
Note: Intervals include the lower limit. 22  Contributions by Individuals 
among households in propensities to contribute, and this is much more so 
among all households than among those who itemize their deductions. 
2.1.1 
The organizations to which individuals contribute include churches and 
other religious groups, schools and colleges, hospitals and health organi- 
zations, community-welfare organizations, combined appeals, and other 
causes and organizations.  Table 2.5 presents information regarding the 
distribution of individual gifts based on three different sources of data-a 
tabulation of itemized tax returns in 1962 and household surveys covering 
1973 and 1978. The most apparent fact is that contributions to religious 
organizations account for the largest share of individual giving, over 60 
percent  in each case.  The distribution of  nonreligious gifts,  however, 
either is more variable or information on it is less certain, or both. Giving 
to seemingly well-defined groups as education and hospitals appears to 
vary markedly, suggesting either some change in giving patterns or non- 
comparabilities between data sources. Giving to education exceeds 9 per- 
cent of the total in the  1973 and  1978 surveys but is only 3.6 percent 
among itemizers in 1962. By the same token, gifts to hospitals appear to 
have had a relative increase between 1962 and 1978. To what extent these 
Contributions by Type of Recipient 
Table 2.5  Percentage of  Total Contributions by 'Qpe  of  OBanization: 
Comparison of  Three Data Sources 
Itemized  National Study  Gallup 
Tax Returns  of  Philanthropy  Survey 
1962  1973  1978 










































Sources: Col. (l), U.S.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1962,  Individual 
Income Tax Returns 1964, p. 6, table E; Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 208, table 38 
(percentages exclude unidentified gifts); Gallup Omnibus 1979, p. 8. 
aNo data given for category. 
bTotal does not equal sum of classes; possibly due to rounding. 23  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
differences are due to differences in methods of classifying gifts is unclear. 
Furthermore, comparisons are inhibited by differences in the categories 
used. 
The surveys do  agree on  the finding that the distribution of giving varies 
markedly by income level. Table 2.6 presents the distribution by income 
level based on households’ four largest gifts in 1973. The proportion of 
gifts made to  religious organizations is largest in the lower-income classes. 
For example, identified religious gifts accounted for 59 percent of all con- 
tributions and 88 percent of identified gifts, for those with incomes below 
$10,000. This pattern is similar to that of the 1962 gifts.6 In contrast, giv- 
ing to higher education grows in importance with income, accounting for 
24 percent of all gifts or almost a third of identified gifts. Similarly, the 
importance  of  gifts to cultural institutions and combined  appeals  in- 
creases with income. 
A number of writers have suggested that, in analyzing charitable contri- 
butions, it is useful to distinguish religious gifts from other contributions. 
Schwartz (1970a, p. 1269) refers to the inclusion of religious gifts in chari- 
table contribution figures a “distracting element, since religious giving is 
not clearly philanthropic.”’  The reasoning would appear to be that a large 
portion of the expenditures of  religious groups pays for salaries, build- 
ings, and operating expenses for local congregations, leaving a relatively 
small portion for transfer outside the congregation. Needless to say, it is 
impossible to measure the “philanthropic”  components in such diverse 
groups as churches,  universities, or local service organizations.  Some 
kinds of personal benefits may be derived from gifts to each, but even 
these benefits tend to be somewhat public and subject to “free rider” be- 
havior. 
One concrete way of  describing the nature of religious giving is by ex- 
amining the pattern of expenditures made by  religious groups.  By  and 
large, expenditures for worship, religious education, and operation ac- 
count for the bulk of  religious expenditures. An estimate of  “nonsacra- 
mental”  expenditures-those  for social welfare,  health  functions, and 
5. Because the  1962 distribution  implies contributions for education and health much 
smaller than those in Giving U.S.A., the 1973 distribution is used in chapter 3 for simula- 
tions. 
6. The proportion of gifts made to religious organizations fell from 71 percent for item- 
izers with incomes below $2000 in 1962 to 3 percent for those with incomes over a million 
dollars (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 1964, Statistics of  Income--1962, Individual Income 
TaxReturns, p. 6, table E). 
It is also interesting to note that a similar distributional pattern can be observed in contri- 
butions data for West Germany. Unpublished data provided by Karl-Heinz Paqut for 1974 
shows that deducted contributions (other than the church tax) rose from about 0.1 percent of 
gross income at the lowest income levels to 0.6 percent in the highest bracket.  Since these 
contributions probably include little if any religious giving, these figures suggest a strong in- 
come effect for nonreligious giving similar to that found in U.S. data. 
7. See also Taussig 1967 and Vickrey 1962. Table 2.6  Contributions by Type of Organization and Income, 1973 (percentage) 
Education 
Medical  Not 
Combined  and  Other  Iden- 
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Source: Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 208, table 38. 
ahformation regarding donees was obtained only for the four major gifts of each donor; therefore additional giving could not be allocated to donee 
categories. 25  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
nonreligious education-amounted  to about 18 percent of total revenues 
for major religious groups in 1972. A survey of  178 local churches in 1972 
showed that 79 percent of total expenditures covered operating costs and 
another 10 percent paid for buildings and capital improvements. Only 11 
percent of  total expenditures went to cover special-purpose or restricted 
uses (Interfaith Research Committee  1977, p. 402). However, these fig- 
ures may understate the amount of redistributional  giving to the extent 
that they omit special offerings. Despite this possible bias as well as the 
lack of  more specific categories, the available data do suggest that sacra- 
mental  functions account for a preponderance of  church expenditures 
and that a relatively small part of  religious spending is redistributional in 
nature. 
2.2  The Tax Treatment of Individual Contributions 
The distinctive feature of US.  tax treatment of  charitable contribu- 
tions is the deduction allowed for taxpayers who itemize their deductions. 
Besides the general tax-exempt status of nonprofit organizations itself, 
the income tax deduction is probably the most important single tax policy 
affecting the vitality of the nonprofit sector in the United States. By  re- 
ducing taxable income and thus tax liability, the deduction has the effect 
of lowering the net cost of making donations. It was adopted in 1917, four 
years after the enactment of the first personal income tax, and was avail- 
able to all of the relatively limited number of Americans who paid income 
taxes through the 1920s and early 1930s. 
2.2.1  The StHndard Deduction 
As the income tax expanded its coverage and raised its rates, however, a 
standard deduction was introduced in 1944 along with payroll deductions 
in an effort to achieve high compliance with a minimum of  administra- 
tion. Many low- and middle-income taxpayers elected this standard de- 
duction, leaving only a portion of  the taxpaying public eligible to deduct 
their contributions.  Table 2.7  traces the proportion  of  taxpayers  who 
itemized their deductions for selected years between 1945 and 1980. The 
table also gives the maximum standard deduction allowed a married cou- 
ple. As one would expect, the proportion of  taxpayers who find it advan- 
tageous to itemize deductions has risen as the real value of the standard 
deduction has fallen. Because of its effect on the number of taxpayers 
who can itemize their  contributions,  the standard deduction has been 
8. Even a socially active church like the Riverside Church in New York devoted only about 
19 percent of its budget to benevolences in 1949 (Andrews 1950, p.  174), though these budget 
figures probably omit some special offerings earmarked for redistributional purposes. For a 
discussion of  the redistributional character of  religious expenditures, see Schaefer 1968, pp. 
29-30. 26  Contributions by Individuals 
Table 2.7  Itemization and the Standard Deduction in Selection Years,  1945-80 
Maximum Standard Deductiona 
for a Joint Return 
Proportion of Tax Returns 









































































Source: U.S.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income, Individual Income Tau 
Returns, various years. 
ageginning in 1977, the standard deduction was made a fixed amount and renamed the 
“zero bracket amount.” 
viewed as “a threat to the continued existence of private non-profit activ- 
ity” (Kahn 1960, p. 46). In response to this concern, Congress included in 
the Economic Recovery Act of  1981 a provision that would gradually 
phase  in an “above-the-line”  charitable deduction  applicable to non- 
itemizers as well as itemizer~.~  If it is continued beyond its present expira- 
tion date of 1986, this extension of the charitable deduction would repre- 
sent a substantial change in tax policy towards the nonprofit sector to the 
extent that itemization is an important influence on the level of contribu- 
tions. 
2.2.2  Other Limitations on Deductibility of  Contributions 
Congress has imposed two basic kinds of limitations, besides the stan- 
dard  deduction,  on the  deductibility  of  contributions:  limits  on the 
amount that can be deducted and restrictions on what kinds of organiza- 
9. In 1982 and 1983,25 percent of the first $100 of contributions was to be deductible for 
nonitemizers. The amount was to increase to 25 percent of the first $300 in 1984,50 percent 
without limit in 1985, and all contributions in 1986. 27  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
tions are qualified to receive tax-deductible gifts. Presently, individuals 
may deduct contributions up to 50 percent of their adjusted gross income, 
although gifts to certain organizations must not exceed 20 percent. The 
limit was originally 15 percent of taxable income for gifts to all charitable 
organizations, then was expanded for virtually all taxpayers to 15 percent 
of adjusted gross income in 1944, to 20 percent in 1952, and to 30 percent 
for certain charities in 1954 (Liles and Blum 1975, pp. 25, 30-31).1° The 
present maximum of  50 percent was  adopted in  1969.”  Charities  for 
which the 50 percent limitation applies include all churches, public chari- 
ties, educational institutions, government agencies, and certain private 
foundations.  l2 The 20 percent limit applies to all other charitable organi- 
zations, including most private foundations.  Contributions to the first 
group of charities that exceed the 50 percent limit may be carried forward 
as deductions for five years, but no carry-over is allowed for contribu- 
tions over the 20 percent limit applying to other charities. 
Table 2.8 presents information on the charitable deduction by income 
class for 1980. Both marginal tax rate and giving rise with income. Over 90 
percent of itemizers make some charitable contribution, with the propor- 
tion rising above 95 percent among taxpayers with incomes over $30,000. 
Only 0.2 percent of itemizers reached the limit on deductibility, and the 
value of  gifts exceeding the limit was 6 percent of  deductible contribu- 
tions. The limit on contributions was most often exceeded in the highest 
income classes, with more than 4 percent of taxpayers with incomes over 
$500,000 reaching the limit. These nondeductible gifts exceeded 20 per- 
cent of  giving in each of the three highest income categories. The table 
also suggests, however, that the usage of the carry-over allowed for such 
deductions over the limit roughly corresponds to the incidence of nonde- 
ductible contributions. This suggests that virtually all qualified contribu- 
tions are deductible either in the year made or in the years immediately 
following. 
Integrated with the questions of  which gifts are deductible and what 
limit applies is the tax code’s specification of the kinds of  organizations 
eligible to receive deductible gifts. To begin with, gifts to individuals, no 
matter how sincere the altruistic motive, are not deductible. Only dona- 
tions to certain nonprofit organizations are eligible to be deducted. Ever 
since the deduction was originally enacted, the list of qualifying organiza- 
10. A special provision enacted in 1924 for the benefit of an heirness-nun allowed an un- 
limited deduction for taxpayers who had contributed over 90 percent of their incomes in 
each of the previous 10 years. This provision was relaxed somewhat in 1954 to require such 
giving in 8 of the last 10 years and was phased out in 1974 by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
(Lilesand Blum 1975, pp. 26,32;  Goode 1976, p. 16111.). 
11. Tax Reform Act of.l969(InternalRevenueActs  1971, pp. 301-2). 
12. These foundations include “operating” foundations and foundations designed pri- 
marily as a temporary conduit for contributions. See Arthur Andersen and Company 1982, 
p. 3. Table 2.8  Income, Tax  Rates, and Contributions by Itemizers, 1980 
Percentage of 
Percentage of  Itemized Returns  Contributions 
Average  With  Exceeding  With  Not 
Income  Income  Tax Ratea  butions  Deductions  Limit  overs  Cash  ible 

















































































132,294  0.59  4,531  97.1  1 .o  1  .o  69.5  19.6 






















~  ~~ 
Source: U.S.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1980,  Individual Income Tax Returns  1982,  pp. 56-57,  table 2.1. 
Note: Ranges include the lower limit. 
aMarginal tax rate computed using class averages for married taxpayers filing jointly. 
bLess than 0.05. 29  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
tions has included religious, charitable, educational, literary, and scienti- 
fic organizations. In addition, this list has been expanded periodically, to 
include such organizations as medical research groups, state university en- 
dowment fund,s,  governmental units, and “publicly supported” nonprofit 
organizations (Liles and Blum 1975, pp. 34-35). Amendments in 1918 and 
1934 have stipulated that they must be domestic organizations and not be 
engaged in lobbying (pp. 25-26).13 The limit of 50 percent of income ap- 
plies to such organizations as universities, hospitals, community chests, 
charitable groups, and churches. Examples of  organizations for whom 
gifts are subject only to the 20 percent limit are veterans’ organizations 
and private foundations.’* 
Gifts of property are generally deductible at cost or at full market val- 
ue, depending on the type of asset. Donated property may include such 
items as used clothes and household items, art objects, real estate, or fi- 
nancial assets. For most gifts of  property  with long-term capital gains 
made to charities qualifying for the 50 percent limit, no tax is levied on  the 
capital gains. Combined with the full deduction of the market value, this 
provision creates an added incentive to contribute assets with large, ac- 
crued capital gains. Consider a taxpayer in the 50 percent tax bracket with 
a $10,000 stock holding that he originally purchased for $5000. Assuming 
a 40 percent inclusion rate for long-term capital gains, two options among 
those open to this taxpayer are (1) to increase his disposable income by 
$9000 ($10,000 -  (0.5)(0.4)$5000)  by selling the stock and (2) to contribute 
the stock, receiving a $5000 tax reduction from the deduction. When com- 
pared to the option of selling the stock and consuming the proceeds, the 
amount of coqsumption foregone due to contributing the stock is $9000 
less the tax reduction of $5000, or $4000. In contrast a $10,000  gift of cash 
would reduce consumption opportunities by $5000. 
There are several limitations to the general treatment described here as 
well  as a host of possible forms in which various assets may be given. 
First, gifts to organizations qualifying for the 50 percent limit cannot ex- 
ceed 30 percent of income in the form of property.15 Second, deductions 
for donations of property subject to capital gains taxation made to private 
foundations or other  “20 percent-type organizations”  or donations of 
“tangible personal property”  unrelated  to the recipient organizations’ 
tax-exempt functions are reduced by 40 percent of the amount that would 
have been taxed as long-term capital gain had the asset been sold. In addi- 
tion, gifts of  inventory, assets subject to short-term capital gains, and 
items produced by oneself are not generally deductible at their full fair 
13. See also Goode 1976, pp. 160-61. 
14. See Goode 1976, p. 165, and InternalRevenueCode 1982, sec. 170(b). See chap. 7 for a 
15. The 50 percent limitation applies only if the deduction is reduced by 40 percent of ap- 
discussion of the legal definition of a private foundation. 
preciation. See Internal Revenue Code 1982, sec. 170(b)(l)(c) and 170(e)(l)(B). 30  Contributions by Individuals 
market value (Goode 1976, p.  167, 167n; Internal Revenue Code 1982, 
sec. 170(e)(3)). Before 1969 donors in high tax brackets could usually con- 
tribute an appreciated asset at even lower net cost-and  sometimes make 
a profit-by  selling the asset at cost and taking a deduction for the appre- 
ciated portion. The treatment of such “bargain sales” was tightened in 
1969, however, by requiring the taxpayer to include a portion of the gain 
in taxable income.I6 
Finally, gifts may be made through trusts or trustlike arrangements. A 
trust establishes an endowment, a specified combination of  income and 
remainder payments from that endowment, and a trustee to administer 
the fund. Similar arrangements can be set up with universities or other 
charitable organizations in which the organization administers the fund. 
The tax consequences are the same. One form of trust is a charitable trust, 
which distributes both income and remainder interests to charity. A de- 
duction is allowed for the present value of payments at the time the trust is 
established. In contrast, a split-interest trust has both charitable and non- 
charitable beneficiaries. It may be  a charitable income (or lead) trust, 
which pays a fixed amount or proportion to a charitable organization, or 
a charitable remainder trust, which assigns income to noncharitable bene- 
ficiaries for a period, designating the remainder for a charitable organiza- 
tion. A charitable deduction is allowed for either type as long as the var- 
ious interests are paid  according to a predetermined  nondiscretionary 
formula. For example, charitable remainder trusts qualify for a deduction 
if  the income beneficiaries receive a fixed periodic payment (an annuity 
trust) or a fixed percentage of assets (a unitrust). A pooled-income ar- 
rangement, in which the noncharitable beneficiary receives income from 
funds invested and managed by  a university or other charity, similarly 
qualifies.”  Among its attractive features, a split-interest trust offers a 
means of providing a beneficiary with the income from an asset during his 
or her life while at the same time obtaining a charitable deduction and re- 
ducing the eventual estate tax base. At one time, giving through charitable 
income trusts also offered a way to make contributions beyond the per- 
centage limitation for deductible gifts, but changes in the law in 1969 have 
severely limited this possibility for trusts of less than a ten-year dura- 
16. For example, consider a taxpayer in the 60 percent bracket holding $10,000 worth of 
stock with a basis of $6000. Selling the stock would net $8800 after taxes. Contributing the 
stock to a charity would reduce taxes by $6000 (.6 x lO,000), for a net cost of $2800 compared 
to realization. With a bargain sale, the taxpayer sells the stock to a charity for $6000 and, un- 
der the pre-1969 rules, obtains a $4000 deduction with $2400 in tax reduction, for a total re- 
turn of $8400 and a net cost of only $400. See Penick (1960, p. 117) for similar illustrations 
and 1980 U.S.  Master Tax Guide(1979, p. 941) for an  explanation of the post-1969 law. 
17. For discussions of the tax treatment in this area, see Penick 1960, pp. 118-28; Taggart 
1970; Griswold and Graetz 1976, pp. 923-30;  1980 U.S. Master TaxGuide 1979, p. 167; Sor- 
lien andOlsen 1970, pp. 221-24; or Petska 1983, pp. 1-5. 31  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
tion.’* Despite their variety and attractive features, trusts are used by rela- 
tively few taxpayers for making charitable gifts. In 1979 there were about 
2000 charitable trusts, accounting for $56 million in contributions, and al- 
most  14,000 split-interest trusts, corresponding to another  $61 million 
(Petska 1983, p. 5). Together, these payments were less than one-half of 1 
percent of all individual giving. 
2.2.3  Tax Policy and the Deduction’s Incentive Effect 
In the debate over tax policy since the introduction of  the income tax, 
the role of the charitable deduction in encouraging donations has been di- 
rectly addressed on several occasions. Because of the emphasis in the pre- 
sent study on the impact of taxation on contributions, it is useful to note 
both the importance that such incentives have played in the policy debate 
as well as to review the prevailing opinion among tax scholars as to the de- 
duction’s incentive effect. 
The Charitable Deduction, 191  7 
In the debate that accompanied congressional action to add the chari- 
table deduction in 1917, proponents of the change justified the deduction 
in large part because of its presumed incentive effect. Senator Hollis, the 
sponsor of the amendment, argued that rising income tax rates would hurt 
contributions by reducing the “surplus” out of which gifts are made: “we 
impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, [and] that will be the first place 
where these very wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in 
donations  to charity”  (Congressional Record,  7  September  1917,  p. 
6728).Ig  That the tax effect would primarily be felt at higher incomes fol- 
lows from the limited coverage of the early income tax. The bill passed in 
1917, for example, levied no tax on net incomes below $37,700 in  1982 
dollars and applied tax rates as high as 15 percent only for net incomes 
above $300,000, in 1982 dollars.20  Once the deduction was adopted, its 
significance apparently was not lost on nonprofit organizations. Cornell 
University, for example, cited the law in its endowment drive in  1919, 
pointing out that wealthy individuals would bear only a fraction of the 
cost of gifts they made (New York Times, 1 December 1919, p. 14). 
18. See Penick (1960,  p. 128) for an explanation of how the income limits could  be 
stretched through trusts with lives as short as two years. This was possible because the pres- 
ent value of the charitable interest was deductible while the charitable income interest was 
not taxable to the taxpayer. Current law requires the taxation of such income, thus offsetting 
the original deduction if the marginal tax rate is constant. 
19. See also Kahn (1960, p. 46) and Liles and Blum (1975, p 25) for discussions of the in- 
centive issue in connection with the adoption of the deduction. 
20. The consumer price index relative to 1972 (= 100) was: 38.4 in 1917 and 289.1 in 1982 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960, p. 126; U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1983, p. 221). 
The 15 percent bracket in the 1917 bill began at $40,000 (Congressional  Record7 September 
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The Standard Deduction, 1944 
The growing coverage of the income tax during World War I1 motivated 
a proposal in 1944 to introduce a standard deduction as an alternative to 
itemized deductions. Combined with a withholding system for wages, the 
standard deduction greatly simplified tax compliance for most taxpayers. 
The proposal brought on a storm of opposition on the basis that the incen- 
tive effect of the charitable deduction would be lost. Representative Carl 
Curtis stated, “This bill, when carried into effect, means that the individ- 
ual who gives a portion of his hard-earned  money in contributions will 
have the same amount of taxes withheld from his wages as if he had given 
nothing” (Congressional Record, House, 3 May 1944, p. 4029). Church 
and other nonprofit organizations opposed the standard-deduction pro- 
posal as written, some advocating a payroll deduction linked to employ- 
ees’  anticipated  donations.*’ In  opposition,  Senator  Vandenburg  ex- 
pressed “doubt whether many contributors in [the] lower brackets are 
motivated in their philanthropy by tax-reduction  aims” (Congressional 
Record, Senate, 19 May 1944, p. 4706). In the end, the Congressional de- 
bate came down to weighing the costs of reduced incentives against the 
simplification the standard deduction would bring about.  22 
The Charitable Deduction for  Nonitemizers, 1981 
A third issue that raised the question of the incentive effect of the chari- 
table deduction was the proposal to allow nonitemizers to deduct their 
gifts in addition to those who already itemized their deductions. Proposed 
in  1979 as a means of counteracting the presumed effect  of  declines in 
itemizatiorl on giving, this bill was opposed by the Treasury due to the 
projected revenue losses involved. An important issue in the hearings was 
whether the increases in contributions would be more or less than those 
revenue losses. The Senate hearings on the bill focused on such seemingly 
technical questions as the size of the incentive effect at lower incomes and 
the lag in taxpayers’ response to changes in the tax law. (U.S. Congress, 
Senate 1980, esp. pp. 51-69 and 217-35). 
Scholarly Opinion on the Incentive Eflect 
Despite the arguments made for the charitable deduction and against 
the standard deduction, many commentators have expressed skepticism 
concerning the deduction’s annual incentive effect. Reviewing trends in 
contributions in the 1920s, Syndnor Walker concluded that “the ratio be- 
tween income and contributions is so consistent throughout the period as 
to suggest that giving is more definitely regulated by  habit or tradition 
21. SeeNew York Times, 5 December 1943, p. 1; 4March 1944, p. 11; 5 May 1944, p. 8; 25 
22. For editorial support of  simplification, see “To Simplify Taxes,” New  York Times,  5 
May 1944, p. 19; 20 July 1944, p. 31; 16 September 1944, p. 16; and 1 December 1945. 
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than by changes in income, tax rate, or any external circumstance (Kahn 
1960, p. 47). Similarly, Kahn (pp. 71-72)  concluded that the incentive ef- 
fect of the deduction was weak because the introduction and extension of 
the standard deduction in 1941 and 1950 had no discernible effect on the 
proportion of income being contributed. 
This view remained the prevalent one into the 1970s. Noting the scarcity 
of reliable research on the effect of the deduction up to that point, Aaron 
(1972, p. 21 1) concluded that “the numbers of charitable contributions 
suggest that it is inconceivable that the effect could be very large in the ag- 
gregate.”  Aaron was particularly  dubious regarding the existence of a 
large incentive effect for taxpayers with incomes below $15,000 (p. 21 1). 
Likewise, Vickrey (1975, p. 157) argued that the price elasticity of contri- 
butions was below one in absolute value, stating:  “there is grave doubt 
whether the deduction actually achieves to any detectable extent the in- 
tended  function  of  stimulating  gifts  by  individuals,  as  distinct  from 
merely supplementing such gifts with a government contribution derived 
from what would otherwise have been tax revenue” (p. 153). Hood, Mar- 
tin, and Osberg (1977) agreed, commenting that an elasticity greater than 
one in absolute value “strains credulity” (p. 661). In a 1973 survey, fewer 
than half of households interviewed said they thought the deduction stim- 
ulated giving. However, this proportion rose markedly with income, with 
over 70 percent of  those with incomes over $50,000 believing that the tax 
deduction is a spur to giving (Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, table 19). 
Despite the doubt that exists about the existence and size of the income 
tax’s effect on individual  contributions,  it  is  clear that taxpayers  who 
itemize their deductions do contribute more than nonitemizers. As table 
2.9 shows, itemizers contribute  as much as twice or more what  non- 
Table 2.9  Average Giving by Income and Itemization  Status, 1973 
Income  ltemizers  Nonitemizers 
Less than $4,000 
$4,000-7,999 
$8,000-9,999 
$ 1  0,OOO-  14,999 






$5OO,OOO or more 
Overall average 











$  775 









8,  892a 
5,000a 
$  140 
Source:  Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 193. 
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itemizers at the same income level give. Itemizers in the $10,000 to $14,999 
income class, for example, gave an average of $407, compared to $201 for 
nonitemizers. To what extent this difference is due to a price effect, some 
itemization effect, or other tax considerations is a central question in em- 
pirical work on charitable contributions. 
2.3  Taxation and the Theory of Charitable Behavior 
Students of social behavior, economists included, have devoted consid- 
erable attention to the study of altruism and helping behavior. In apparent 
violation of  the simple economic model of egoistic utility maximization, 
helping behavior is observed in charitable contributions, volunteering, di- 
saster relief, rescues at sea, public policies of  redistribution, much neigh- 
borhood crime prevention, donations of blood, and intrafamily gifts and 
 sacrifice^.'^ Obviously, the nature of this giving and helping varies from 
case to case. In assessing the effect of income taxation on individual chari- 
table behavior, it is useful to begin by summarizing the major theories that 
have been offered to explain helping behavior in general. These theories 
are discussed in the context of utility maximization. The effects of tax de- 
ductibility and other tax policies on the individual’s opportunity set are 
then discussed. Finally, the possibility that government spending may 
“crowd out” private giving is considered. 
2.3.1 
Although the lines cannot be drawn precisely, it is possible to distin- 
guish several possible motivations for helping and giving. As shown by 
the survey responses summarized in table 2.10, the reasons offered for 
making contributions suggest various dimensions of unselfish as well as 
self-interested motives.  For  example, 44  percent  of  respondents  men- 
tioned  “belonging”  as their first or second reason for making religious 
gifts, while the same percentage mentioned receiving benefits from giving 
to higher education. In contrast, pressure was cited most often as a reason 
for giving to combined appeals. In trying to explain giving in theory, one 
useful classification (Obler 1981) distinguishes three basic motivations: 
altruism, reciprocity, and direct benefit. 
Altruism 
Altruism, behavior that has little or no observable selfishness, may be 
founded on sympathetic feelings for others, social norms, or individual 
feelings of commitment. Economists, with characteristic homeliness, de- 
Theories of  Helping and Giving 
23. For analyses of  various manifestations of  helping behavior, see Bolnick 1975, 1978; 
Clotfelter 1980a; Douty 1972; Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Hammond 1975; Landes and 
Posner 1978a, 1978b; Macauley and Berkowitz 1970; and Titmuss 1971. For a thorough re- 




They Need Money,  Get Some  Pressure,  Other,  Number 
Feel Obligated  Benefit  “Belongs”  Quota  DK, NA  of Gifts 
Religious  69% 
Combined  66 
Community, other  77 
Health  53 
Higher education  66 
Other education  74 
Social welfare  77 
Cultural  75 
Overall averages and total  61% 
Source: Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p. 204, table 34. 
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aNumbers are sums of  percents of first and second mentions for each reason among those who gave $100 or more in 1973. Percentages are based on  gifts to 
various donee organizations, not dollars of giving. The question posed was: Why did you give to this organization? 36  Contributions by Individuals 
scribe the sympathy and compassion that individuals commonly feel for 
their fellows as a manifestation of the interdependence of individual util- 
ity functions. Thus individual A may value his own consumption Xu as 
well as that of his neighbor B: U,  = (X,,X,).  If the marginal utility of X, 
is positive, then A’s  contributions to B take on the usual characteristics of 
the consumption of ordinary economic goods.  24 One implication of pref- 
erences of this kind is that donations  will depend on the relative, not abso- 
lute, well-being of potential recipients. 
Behavior in this case can be illustrated  by an individual’s choice be- 
tween personal consumption and charitable contributions,  as shown in 
figure 2.2. Other kinds of helping behavior are ignored. In the absence of 
tax deductibility, the individual’s after-tax income 0, ( = 0,) is divided be- 
tween personal consumption and contributions as shown by the budget 
line ab. The indifference curves U, and U,* illustrate two different prefer- 
ence sets. In both, contributions to person B is a good and the indifference 
curves are negatively sloped over the range shown.*5  The equilibrium for 
indifference curve U,  includes both personal consumption and charitable 
contributions and, as drawn, satisfies the usual conditions for a utility 
maximum. In the absence of a tax deduction, the optimum point E,  is the 
point at which the marginal rate of  substitution between contributions 
and own consumption is equal to one. In contrast, the marginal rate of 
substitution of  U,*  is less than one, resulting in a corner solution of no 
contributions, despite the fact that contributions have positive marginal 
utility. The fact that about 16 percent of  all households contributed nei- 
0  b 
xb 
Fig. 2.2  Alternative  preference sets for own consumption (Xu)  and con- 
sumption of another (X,). 
24. A may value B’s utility, income, or particular consumption components. For an analy- 
sis of the implications of interdependent utilities, see Hochman and Rodgers 1969. For an 
application to charitable contributions, see Schwartz 1970a. 
25.  The marginal utility of  contributions may fall to zero as B becomes better off. See 
Hochman and Rodgers 1969 or Throsby and Withers 1979, p. 249. 37  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
ther cash nor volunteer time in 1981 indicates that this corner solution is 
not uncommon (Gallup Organization 1981, p. 24). 
Social norms constitute another source of altruistic behavior. Often re- 
inforced by social pressure, norms produce behavior that is indistinguish- 
able from that arising  from interdependent utility functions. Whether 
such social mechanisms arise to prevent “free rider” behavior or for other 
reasons, it is argued that they are an important determinant of giving and 
other charitable behavior.26  In the presence of norms, the act of  making 
contributions is assumed to increase utility. Thus preferences may be de- 
scribed by the same kind of indifference curves as those used to illustrate 
charity based on interdependent variables, as shown in figure 2.2. 
Sen (1977) has argued, however, that not all altruistic behavior must 
necessarily increase utility. Instead of explaining all giving in terms of  the 
standard model of utility maximization, Sen distinguishes a sense of duty 
or commitment that may lead individuals to do things plainly not in their 
own best interest. Obviously, this criticism goes to the heart of economic 
theory itself. As such, it is a theory that can be neither analyzed in terms of 
the assumption of utility maximization nor utilized in assessing the likely 
effects of tax policy on individual giving. 
Reciprocity 
In contrast to altruism, reciprocal helping involves the consideration 
that help may be returned.  Obler (1981) argues that mutual-aid  associ- 
ations and churches, both characterized by aid or assistance among mem- 
bers, have high components of reciprocal giving. The argument has been 
carried to the @el  of the social community by viewing much helping be- 
havior as a kind of social insurance. According to this view, philanthropy 
and everyday helping behavior are part of an informal mutual insurance 
pact whereby society’s fortunate compensate the less fortunate.*’ To the 
extent to which this is important, then, people act charitably for the same 
reason they buy insurance. Since this kind of giving brings the benefit of 
26. An explanation of how group pressures may inspire philanthropic behavior is given by 
Bolnick (1975, p. 220): “assuming the existence of an organization to direct and administer a 
charity drive, we  can expect this group to generate communications to the community at 
large. Depending on the status of this organizational core and the amount of norm-sending 
generated, there will be a tendency for members of the community to contribute. These indi- 
viduals in turn will generate chains of primary group pressures, tending to induce more con- 
tributions.  In addition, the members of the organizing group will each generate a chain of 
primary group pressures, the strength of these pressures varying with the prestige of the ini- 
tiators. Through these channels of influence, much of the community will be exposed to di- 
rect and/or indirect social pressures to contribute to the charity, and will base their decisions 
upon the strength of thse pressures, the utility derived from giving to the particular project, 
and the cost of choosing to contribute.”  As to the effectiveness of peer pressure, Morgan, 
Dye, and Hybels (1977, p. 274) report that 45 percent of their sample believed that people 
would give more if the amount given were made public. 
27. See, for example, Douty 1972; Becker 1974, p.  1084; Landes and Posner 1978b; and 
Hirshleifer 1978. 38  Contributions by Individuals 
potential return aid, the standard economic model shown in figure 2.2 
would again apply. How much giving of this sort would be forthcoming 
depends, of course, on the shape of the indifference curves, which in turn 
is a function of the importance and effectiveness of that potential aid. 
Direct Benejt 
Finally, helping may arise out of  some more immediate or tangible 
benefit. Individuals may volunteer  for organizations in order for their 
families or themselves to consume services. Thus Sunday-school teachers 
and soccer coaches often supervise their own children. As Olson (1971, p. 
34) explains this kind of participation, “in a very small group, where each 
member gets a substantial portion of the total gain simply because there 
are few members in the group, a collective good can often be provided by 
the voluntary, self-interested action of the members of the group.” Do- 
nors may derive more ethereal personal benefit from making contribu- 
tions as well. Weisbrod (1978b, p.  34) describes the character  of  such 
benefits: 
The extent to which narrow self-interest lies behind the donations of 
money and time to non-profit  organizations is little understood, but 
there can be no doubt that donors often do benefit through the making 
of  business contacts and the receipt of  favorable publicity for good 
deeds. Having a library, park, or college classroom building named 
after a donor can be viewed as reflecting philanthropy but it can also be 
viewed as the reward for a donation-and,  hence, as a form of pur- 
chase. Even small donors frequently receive tangible and direct returns 
in such forms as receipts of  a “free” magazine, access to organized 
meetings with like-minded people, or other information, goods, or ser- 
vices, in return for their tax-deductible “gifts,” “donations,” “volun- 
tary contributions,” or membership dues. The motivation of those who 
make these contributions are doubtless complicated. 
To the extent that contributions “buy” such tangible or intangible con- 
sumer goods, contributions again fall naturally into the standard utility- 
maximization framework, as shown in figure 2.2. An extension of  this 
model is called for, however, in the case that contributions actually in- 
crease own consumption over some range. For example, a proprietor’s 
contribution  to local charities  may increase profits through  favorable 
publicity.  Or, individuals  may gain valuable job skills from volunteer 
work, particularly women who may have been out of the labor market for 
some time.28  In such cases it is unnecessary to postulate that donors re- 
ceive any direct utility from helping others since helping is literally its own 
reward.  Thus individuals  who  are indifferent about the  well-being of 




Fig. 2.3  Contributions  with gains from giving. 
beneficiaries will contribute or help. Figure 2.3 illustrates the choice for 
an individual who can gain income over some range by making contribu- 
tions. The solid curve hd is the budget line after taxes but with no tax de- 
ductibility. Optimal contributions are positive whether the donor values 
making the gift itself (U,)  or is indifferent (U,*).  If contributions are de- 
ductible at a constant rate, the budget set swivels in a counterclockwise di- 
rection to hft causing contributions to increase under both preference as- 
sumptions. Although such a positively sloped budget set is conceivable, 
the remainder of this section is confined to the analysis of the usual nega- 
tively sloped budget sets. 
To sum up, helping behavior in the form of donations or charitable ac- 
tions may be divided, roughly, into altruism, reciprocal helping, or strictly 
self-interested activity. Except for Sen’s notion of  commitment, this be- 
havior can be analyzed in terms of a general utility-maximization model. 
Where no monetary gain is  expected, helping based on interdependent 
utilities, norms, or personal consumption all look the same, though the 
underlying motivations obviously differ greatly. For the purpose of pre- 
dicting individual  behavior,  there is  little practical  difference between 
helping others because sympathy inspires it, society expects it, or tastes 
demand it. In analyzing the effects of income tax treatment, therefore, in- 
dividuals are simply assumed to value contributions and their own con- 
sumption as two goods and to maximize utility subject to a tax-defined 
budget constraint. 
2.3.2  The Effect of Income Taxation 
If an individual’s giving behavior can be explained in a way consistent 
with utility maximization, the effect of income taxation on giving can be 
analyzed using conventional  microeconomic models. The individual is 
seen as deriving satisfaction from contributions (G)  and his own con- 
sumption of other goods (3:  U  = U(X,G).  Where gross income is Y and 40  Contributions by Individuals 
taxes are a function of income and contributions (T(XG)),  the maximiza- 
tion problem is 
(1)  maximize U(X,  G), 
(2)  subject to Y - T(KG) = X  + G. 
Using primes to denote partial derivatives, the resulting equilibrium con- 
dition is 
(3) 
Since T’ (G)  is the rate at which taxes are reduced per dollar of contribu- 
tion, equation (3) states that the marginal rate of  substitution between 
contributions and own consumption is equal to the net-of-tax “price” of 
making contributions. Where contributions are a deduction in calculating 
taxable income, the marginal effect of contributions is the negative of the 
marginal tax rate, T’ (G) = -  T‘ (y), and (3) reduces to 
(3‘) 
In order to analyze the likely effect of the tax treatment of charitable con- 
tributions, it is useful to examine in detail several existing or possible tax 
provisions. 
Deductibility 
The most important tax provision affecting charitable contributions in 
the United States is, of course, the deduction allowed for such gifts. Fig- 
ure 2.4  shows the individual’s budget lines under a progressive income tax 
with and without a deduction for contributions. The line ab is the budget 
set when there is no deduction, and its slope is -  1, reflecting the fact that 
a dollar of contributions costs a full dollar in this case. The height of  the 
budget line Oa  is after-tax income. The line acdef  is the budget set in the 
presence of a charitable deduction. The segmented nature of the budget 
line reflects the progressivity of  the rate structure. The tax rate at which 
contributions are deducted will usually decline at some point as increasing 
contributions place the taxpayer in a lower marginal rate bracket.  The 
slope of segment ac is -  (1 -  m,),  where m,  is the marginal tax rate apply- 
ing to the first dollar of  contributions. The slopes of succeeding segments 
become steeper as the applicable marginal rate falls. If there is a ceiling on 
the deduction of contributions-here  assumed to be point e-the  slope be- 
comes -  1 thereafter. The optimal point shown in the figure for a taxpayer 
receiving a deduction is K,  in segment de,  corresponding to the tax rate 
m,,  where m,  < ml.  At E2  the marginal rate of substitution between con- 
tributions and own consumption is (1 -  m,). 41  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
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Effect of income tax deduction for contributions. 
In general, then, the deductibility of contributions has an income effect 
and a substitution effect. If giving is a normal good, both effects will tend 
to  encourage cpntributions. If the individual chooses a point on the initial 
segment of the budget line (ac),  the deduction is equivalent to a reduction 
in the price of contributions, and the budget line turns counterclockwise 
on point a. If another budget line is chosen, however, the progressivity of 
rates implies a result different  from this standard effect. For example, 
moving from budget line ab to segment de amounts to combining two 
changes: (a) a price reduction from 1 to (1 -  m2)  and (b) an exogenous in- 
crease of  ah in disposable income. The amount ah has been referred to as 
the “tax schedule premium,” which arises from the higher rate@)  at which 
some inframarginal contributions were deducted from income. In esti- 
mating and predicting tax effects on giving, this additional income effect 
ideally should be taken into account. 
In order to make the connection between the hypothetical rate schedule 
implied in figure 2.4 and actual income taxes, table 2.1 1 presents the bud- 
get set for a taxpaying household with average income in 1980. Mean val- 
ues of  exemptions and deductions were chosen for the income class corre- 
sponding to mean adjusted gross income (AGI) in 1980 ($37,461). Since 
budget lines will generally be different for each household, the case pre- 
sented  can  only be  illustrative.  Maximum  own consumption  for this Table 2.11  Budget Line Segments for Average Itemizing Household, 1980 (adjusted gross income = $37,461) 
Net  Income  Tax Schedule 
Less Contri-  PremiumC 
Tax Liability at  butions at  Price of 
Contribution  Lower Contri-  Lower Contri-  Giving in  As Percentage 
Range  bution Levela  bution Level  Rangeb  Total  of  31,055d 






18,73  If-36,094 
$6406  $3 1,055  0.63e  $0  1 
6201  30,705  0.68  28  0.1 
4505  27,101  0.72  527  1.7 
3273  23,933  0.76  1333  4.3 
2265  20,741  0.79  2313  7.4 
1404  17,502  0.82  3526  11.4 
I367  17,363  1 .oo  6930  22.3 
Note:  Calculations based on joint return in 1980 with AGI of $37,461. Average figures for the $30,000-50,000 AGI class were also used: excess itemized 
deductions-$4564;  contributions-$858;  exemptions-$3300. 
aTaxable income is AGl - (exemptions) - (lower contribution level) - (other excess itemized deductions). 
‘The  tax schedule premium is the difference between first-dollar net income and the hypothetical net income implied by extrapolating the appropriate 
budget segment. Where Pi  is .63, Pi  = price applying to a given segment, and G;  is the minimum contribution level for a segment, the premium is GAP; - 
PO. 
dFirst-dollar net income. 
eFirst-dollar price of  giving. 
‘Fifty percent limitation on deduction as percent of AGI is assumed to apply. 
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household (corresponding to Oa  in figure 2.4) is $31,055, and the price of 
initial gifts (the “first-dollar” price) is 0.63. Since no contributions over 
half of AGI are ded~ctible,~~  the price of giving becomes 1 .O beyond gifts 
of  $18,731. If  this hypothetical household gave the average amount for 
the $30,000-50,000 class, $858, the table shows that the second budget 
segment, corresponding to a price of 0.68, would be chosen. In this case, 
the extra-income effect due to the tax schedule premium is $28, or 0.1 per- 
cent of beginning net income. For this premium to amount to as much as 4 
percent of net income, contributions would have had to be about 12 times 
the actual average for the class. On the other hand, if  other deductions 
had been about $500 more, or $300 less, the average gift of  $858 would 
have been located on the initial budget segment. Despite the theoretical 
nonlinearity of  tax-defined budget sets, therefore, the figures in this table 
suggest that the average household in practice faces a nearly linear budget 
set and that the effect of tax deductibility is quite close to that of a simple 
price decrease. 
Within the general utility-maximization framework used here, it is pos- 
sible to identify particular preferences that yield special cases of the effect 
of tax deductibility on giving. One interesting special case is that of the 
“target giver.” If the target is stated in terms of gross contributions, the in- 
dividual’s giving will not be affected by income or price changes. Alterna- 
tively, the target may be stated in terms of contributions net of subsidy, or 
“sacrifice.” As Feldstein and Lindsey (1981, pp. 21-22) note, a target level 
of sacrifice implies that decreases in price will lead to equi-proportional 
increases in gross contributions, resulting in the same behavior as would 
be observed for,an individual with a unitary price elasticity. 
Changes in Tax Rates 
Although  not  explicitly a  policy  directed  toward  charitable giving, 
changes in the tax rate schedule will generally have an effect on the indi- 
vidual’s choice between  giving  and  own  consumption.  Such tax  rate 
changes may arise  from tax legislation or from inflationary  “bracket 
creep.” To illustrate the effect of a tax rate change, consider a proportion- 
al increase in all tax brackets. The result of this tax increase would be to 
shift the budget set toward the origin and to make it steeper. In other 
words, there would be an income effect discouraging contributions (if giv- 
ing is a normal good) and a substitution effect encouraging contributions. 
The net effect of a given tax increase would depend on the size of the in- 
come and price elasticities and on the nature of the tax cut itself.30 
29. The 50 percent limit is assumed. 
30. For further discussion of these effects, see Schwartz 1970a, p. 1272. 44  Contributions by Individuals 
Tax Credit 
One logical alternative to a charitable deduction is a tax credit-a  re- 
duction in taxes by some proportion of  charitable contributions. While 
the price of giving under a deduction depends on the taxpayer’s marginal 
tax rate, under a credit all taxpayers would face the same price of giving. 
With  a tax credit  of  lOOn  percent  for contributions,  taxes  would  be 
T = f(Y) - nG where f(Y)  is the tax function, and the price of giving in 
equation (3) would be 1 -  n. Figure 2.5 illustrates the effect of a tax credit 
by showing a credit of 25 percent (n = 0.25). Such a credit has the same 
effect as a price subsidy,  with both the income and substitution effects 
leading to more contributions when giving is a normal good. As can be 
seen by comparing figures 2.4 and 2.5, a tax credit at rate n will have pre- 
cisely the same effect on giving (cash gifts) as a deduction for a taxpayer 
whose marginal tax rate is n if the equilibrium occurs in the budget set’s 
first segment. Otherwise, the deduction will have a larger income effect by 
virtue of the rate “progression premium,” although this difference may 
be quite small. If a tax credit were substituted for the present deduction, 
however, the prices faced  by most taxpayers would  change since there 
would likely be a single tax-credit rate n for all taxpayers. The price of giv- 
ing for taxpayers with marginal tax rates above that rate would increase, 
and the price for taxpayers with low tax rates would fall. Since both the 
size of gifts and the intended beneficiaries tend to vary by the income of 
donors, a tax credit is likely to result in markedly different size and distri- 
bution of total contributions, a possibility considered  in more detail in 
chapter 3. 
Multiple Deduction 
Another alternative to a simple charitable deduction is a deduction for 
some multiple of contributions.  While this multiple could in principle be 
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Figs. 2.5 and 2.6  Effect of tax credit and multiplied deduction in contributions. 45  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
less than 100 percent, proposals to alter this proportion, such as that made 
by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, have fo- 
cused on increasing the deduction percentage beyond loo.)' Figure 2.6 il- 
lustrates the effect of a multiple deduction by showing how a deduction of 
150 percent affects the budget set. This provision pushes the budget set 
out from acd to aef. The initial price of  giving falls from (1 -ml)  to 
(1 -  rrnl),  where r is the deduction rate (in this case, 1.5) and rnl is the tax- 
payer's  marginal tax rate applicable to the first dollar of contributions. 
For any given deduction rate r, the higher the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, 
the greater the percentage point decrease in the price of giving. 
One special case of the multiple deduction arises in connection with 
gifts of appreciated property. As Schwartz (1970a) first pointed out, the 
fact that capital gains on donated assets are generally not taxable reduces 
the price on such gifts from (1 -  rn) to  (1 -  rn -  rncg), where rn, is the mar- 
ginal tax rate on capital gains and g is the gain-to-value ratio. If u is the 
portion of long-term gains included in taxable income, the price is (1 -  rn 
(1 +  ug)).  This tax treatment is equivalent to a multiple deduction of cash 
proceeds of lOO(1-  ug) percent. 
Deduction Floor 
A special case of the charitable deduction is a deduction allowed only 
for contributions over some minimum amount or floor.32  This floor might 
be an absolute dollar amount or might be calculated as some percentage 
of gross income. Proposals for deduction floors have been supported as 
ways to maintain incentives to give while reducing the revenue cost of the 
deduction. The existence of a standard deduction may also act as a deduc- 
tion floor for some taxpayers. Whether the standard deduction is a con- 
stant amount or is calculated as a percentage of income, it is advantageous 
to taxpayers to choose the standard deduction as long as itemized deduc- 
tions are less. A taxpayer whose potential itemized deductions other than 
contributions  are $100 less than the standard  deduction effectively re- 
ceives no deduction for his first $100 of contributions. There is an effec- 
tive floor of $100: only when contributions exceed that amount will tax li- 
ability be reduced. For taxpayers facing either type of deduction floor, the 
price of giving is 1 initially; then it falls when the floor is exceeded. 
The budget set for an individual confronting a deduction floor is shown 
as abd in figure 2.7. The budget set without the deduction is abc, and the 
floor is e dollars of giving. Along the segment ab the price of giving is 1, 
but it falls to (1 -  rnl) in the first segment to the right of b, where rnl is the 
applicable marginal tax rate. Unlike the budget set applying to the unlim- 
31. See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 1977, p. 4. For discussions 
of the multiple deduction, see Hood, Martin, and Osberg 1977 or Throsby and Withers 1979. 
32. A floor has an analogous effect for a tax credit. 46  Contributions  by Individuals 
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Fig. 2.1  Effect of tax deduction with floor on  contributions. 
ited deduction, the budget set in this case is no longer convex from above. 
As suggested by  the hypothetical  indifference curve Ul,  discontinuous 
jumps in desired contributions could occur with very small changes in the 
tax rate, net income, or the floor amount. 
The analysis of giving with a deduction floor raises two important is- 
sues-one  econometric and one behavioral. First, the effective floor cre- 
ated by the standard deduction creates a class of taxpayers who become 
itemizers only by virtue of their charitable gifts. For such “borderline” 
itemizers, the price of giving the first dollar of contributions is one, and it 
is incorrect-to  assume that itemization status is independent of the choice 
about how much to give. This point is considered in section 2.4 of  this 
chapter. 
The behavioral issue raised by the case of a deduction floor is the possi- 
bility that taxpayers under such a plan might tend to “bunch” their gifts, 
say in alternate years, in order to obtain maximum benefit from the de- 
duction. Clearly, this possibility points up one limitation of using a one- 
period model to examine contribution behavior. One way to see the impli- 
cations of  a floor for the pattern of  giving over time is in a simple two- 
period  model  of  contributions.  Suppose an individual is  prepared  to 
contribute, in present value terms, S dollars net of  taxes over two years 
and that gifts above a floor of M” dollars are deductible at rates kl  and kz 
in the two years. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the two-period opportunity set 
for various floor  level^.^' Because only gifts over the floor receive the de- 
duction,  the  maximum  net  gift  of  S  in  year  1 yields  a gross gift  of 
M” +(S-M”)/(l-kl).  When the floor is relatively large, as in figure 2.8 
(MI)  the opportunity set can be  markedly nonconvex from above. Fur- 
33. For constructing figures 2.8 and 2.9, kl  = k2 = .33 and the rate of interest is .lo. 47  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
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Fig. 2.8 and 2.9  Contributions  with a deduction floor in a two-period model. 
thermore,  if  there is a high  degree of  substitutability  between gifts in 
either year, indifference curves will tend to be flat and bunching of gifts in 
one year or the other is likely to occur. In contrast, when the floor is either 
very high or very low, it is less likely that bunching will occur. In figure 
2.9, a high floor of M2  yields a nearly straight budget set ofjwzk. When no 
floor exists, the budget set is the straight line rv. Whether bunching will oc- 
cur thus depends on the relative size of the floor, the deduction rate, and 
the degree to which gifts in one year substitute for gifts in another. Al- 
though there appear to be some forces favoring relatively constant period- 
ic gifts, at least to the extent that contributions follow involvement in or- 
ganizations, it is, quite conceivable that a floor could encourage alternate- 
year timing of gifts.34 
2.3.3  Relative Income, Government Expenditures, and 
“Crowding Out” 
A final question of considerable theoretical interest is how the well-be- 
ing of  potential recipients affects donations. If giving is motivated by in- 
terdependence  in  utility  functions,  one might  predict  that  donations 
would increase as potential recipients become more needy.  Two empir- 
ically testable implications follow from this reasoning. First, donors moti- 
vated by interdependence in utility functions will tend to give more as the 
income of  recipients, relative to theirs, falls. As Becker (1974, p.  1084) 
states, “an increasein the incomes of both recipients and givers should not 
increase giving by as much as an increase in the incomes of givers alone.” 
Accordingly, some of the empirical studies discussed in the following sec- 
tions include relative income as an explanatory variable for giving. 
34. For a further discussion of contributions in the presence of deduction floors, see Feld- 
stein and Lindsey 1981 and the duscussion of simulation methods in chap. 3. 48  Contributions by Individuals 
A second implication of utility interdependence, one that is directly ap- 
plicable to public finance, is that government expenditures will tend to 
crowd out private giving to the extent that government programs make re- 
cipients better off  or provide similar services to those provided through 
charitable organizations. How complete this effect is depends upon how 
closely substitutable government services are with private gifts and what 
exactly enters the utility functions of donors. If donors care only about re- 
cipients’ income levels, a public-income maintenance program may well 
completely supplant private charity. If, however, donors value attributes 
that cannot be provided by government, or if  donors value the act of giv- 
ing itself, private giving is less likely to be crowded out. Rose-Ackerman 
(1  98 1) suggests that government programs could even encourage private 
giving, depending on the difference in public and private services, the 
scale economies of charities, regulations imposed on charities, and the ef- 
fects  of  increased  government  and  on  information  about  charities. 
Obler’s (1981, pp. 33, 36) observations about charities in an English vil- 
lage are interesting in this regard. He found that only one new social-wel- 
fare charity had arisen since the rapid rise in government health and wel- 
fare  programs.  Over  the  same  period,  in  contrast,  the  number  of 
recreational and self-help groups had mushroomed, suggesting that the 
primary crowding out that resulted from the growth of the welfare state 
occurred in areas where government programs were most closely substi- 
tutable with charitable activities. 
2.3.4  Conclusion 
This section has reviewed alternative explanations for giving, noting 
that  most  are consistent  with  the standard  economic model of  utility 
maximization subject to a budget constraint. By focusing on the effects of 
various tax provisions on possible combinations of consumption and con- 
tributions, it is possible to show the effect of tax provisions on an individ- 
ual with given income and preferences. In general, tax inducements have 
income and substitution effects, both of which encourage giving if  giving 
is a normal good. It is useful, however, to summarize several assumptions 
implicit in this basic model. First, both labor supply and gross income are 
assumed to be constant. By and large, therefore, the models neither allow 
for the possibility that giving will  increase income, nor do they make 
allowance for tax effects on volunteer time. Second, the model rests on 
the assumption that making contributions increases an individual’s utility. 
As for contributions motivated  by Sen’s notion of  commitment,  there 
seems to be no direct way to adapt models based on utility maximization 
for the purpose of predicting the effects of income taxation on contribu- 
tions. The conclusion of this section is conditioned, therefore, on the as- 
sumption that contributions,  at least over some range, increase utility. 
Third, the basic model deals with optimization in a single period and does 
not consider multi-period effects of tax policies. 49  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
2.4  Econometric Studies of Contributions by Individuals: An Overview 
Since 1967 there have appeared over a dozen econometric studies of 
charitable giving by individuals. Using different kinds of data and various 
model specifications, they have examined the effect on contributions of 
income, the income tax, and a host of other factors. This section reviews 
this empirical literature,  focusing on the models and variables used to 
specify the individual’s decision to contribute. Results contained in the 
studies are then described. 
2.4.1  Model and Variables 
ory, an individual’s “demand” for contributions usually takes the form 
Analogous to the specification of demand functions in consumer the- 
(4) 
where G measures contributions, Y is disposable income, Pis  the “price” 
uf giving, and Z is a vector of other explanatory variables. Although the 
connection between utility and demand functions is seldom made explicit, 
it is possible to derive specific utility functions consistent with particular 
demand functions by utilizing the condition for utility maximization that 
the price of giving is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between 
giving and other  In most empirical studies the demand function 
takes the log-linear form: 
(5)  G  = AY’Pehz, 
where A, a, and, b are constants and h is a vector of constants. For estima- 
tion purposes, (5)  can be transformed by taking logarithms: 
(6) 
leaving a form that is linear in its parameters. A principal assumption im- 
plicit in the adoption of the log-linear model is, of course, that the income 
and price elasticities are constants. Several of the most important issues of 
specification in this literature come down to a question of whether this 
constant elasticity assumption is valid. 
InG = InA  + aln Y + blnP +  hZ, 
Contributions 
The measure of contributions G is invariably based on the dollar value 
of gifts made. This is not surprising, since contributions are reported in 
dollars on tax returns and counted in dollars by recipient organizations; 
however, the dollar value of contributions is not necessarily an ideal mea- 
35.  For example, the function U(G,  XZ)  = (l/(a+  l))C a+lZc  + (l/(b+  1))@+IZd  im- 
plies a first-order condition of P = MRS = GaY-bZc-d,  or G = P”a@’uZ(d-c)’u,  which is 
the log-linear form of the demand function. Diminishing marginal utility implies a < 0 and b 
< 0; thus the expected signs of the exponents are negative for price (l/a) and positive for in- 
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sure of giving. It might be more desirable to measure units of final “out- 
put” provided by  charitable organizations as a result of an individual’s 
contributions. Like expenditures in education and other areas of  service 
delivery, contributions measure the cost of inputs, not output. Neither the 
relative cost nor the productivity of inputs is accounted for in that dollar 
measure, in large part because the output of the nonprofit sector is  so 
heterogenous and knowledge about production relationships is so limited. 
On the other hand, one may argue that the dollar value of contributions is 
the most appropriate measure of  giving when individuals typically have 
only vague notions of how their gifts are translated into the provision of 
services. While some contributors may have a rough idea about the pro- 
portion of an organization’s budget devoted to administration and fund 
raising, for example, most lack the time and expertise to assess and com- 
pare unit costs of  service provision. In any case, the form in which data 
are available dictates that giving will be measured by the monetary value 
of contributions. 
There are two basic sources for contributions data used in econometric 
studies of individual giving. The most readily available information is that 
based on the returns of taxpayers who itemize their deductions. Because 
the charitable deduction is a tax feature of long standing-and  potential 
tax savings-it  is widely utilized among itemizing taxpayers. More impor- 
tant, it is a deduction with relatively few constraints: for itemizers it is nei- 
ther subject to a floor, like the medical deduction, nor dependent on other 
taxpayer characteristics, like the deductions for taxes and interest. There 
are, however, two principal weaknesses of the contributions data based on 
itemized deductions. First, no data are available for taxpayers who elect 
to take the standard deduction. The result is that econometric studies us- 
ing tax return data are necessarily based on itemizers only. If the behavior 
of taxpayers who itemize is different from that of other taxpayers, the re- 
sulting estimates will, of course, not be representative of the latter. More 
important, equations based on samples of  itemizers may be subject to 
sample selection bias if the decision to itemize is itself a function of contri- 
butions. This possibility is discussed below in section 2.5 of this chapter. A 
second potential weakness of  contributions data based on tax returns is 
the possibility of systematic overstatement. Not only is there an incentive 
for taxpayers to remember “too much,” the incentive to overstate gifts 
rises with the marginal tax rate, leading to a potential confounding of giv- 
ing and cheating effects. Available data on reporting suggest that the ag- 
gregate  amount of  overstatement  is  relatively small for contributions 
(Clotfelter 1983b, appendix). The possibility of confounded price effects 
is discussed further in section 2.5 below. 
The second major source of data on individual contributions is infor- 
mation  from household  surveys.  Although the accuracy of  survey re- 
sponses may be less than information given on tax returns, surveys have 
the advantage of including nonitemizers as well as itemizers. One possible 51  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
bias would remain, however, if nonitemizers-because  they have no rea- 
son to keep records of gifts for tax purposes-tend  to underreport their 
giving in household surveys. There is, unfortunately, no evidence on the 
existence or extent of this bias, nor is there a way to test this possibility 
with available data. It is worth noting, however, because such differential 
reporting rates could provide at least a partial explanation for differences 
in reported giving based on itemization status. 
Price 
Based on the discussion above of an ideal measure of giving, the price 
of giving would be defined as the foregone consumption to an individual 
of providing a unit of output to a given recipient. To the extent that fac- 
tors such as exemption from the property tax or the use of volunteer labor 
(or the payment of  below-market wages) reduces the cost of providing 
such a unit, the price of giving would be reduced. In addition, the price 
would depend on the level of output if the “supply curve” of  charitable 
services is upward sloping. For example, the cost of providing counseling 
services could rise as the number of  users increases. Due to the difficulty 
of defining outputs and identifying relevant production functions, how- 
ever, these kinds of  variations in output price are ignored in defining the 
price of giving. In particular, the supply curve for services is assumed to  be 
horizontal.  36 
Following Vickrey (1962) and Schwartz (1970a) virtually all of the econ- 
ometric studies of contributions use as the basic measure of the price the 
after-tax foregone consumption per dollar of giving. In the presence of an 
income tax with,marginal rate m,  the basic price of giving is simply (1-m). 
In practice, however, the calculation of the price can involve considerable 
complexity. To begin with, the federal income tax code contains a number 
of special features that can affect marginal tax rates. Rather than simply 
calculating taxable income and referring to the appropriate tax schedule, 
a complete calculation of marginal tax rates usually requires calculation 
of  tax liability at two levels of  contributions and then  calculating the 
slope. Further complications arise from such special features as income 
averaging,  the  alternative tax  on capital  gains,  the  maximum tax  on 
earned income, the minimum tax, and tax surcharges. For example, in- 
come averaging has the effect of reducing an individual’s marginal tax rate 
below what it would otherwise be on a given amount of taxable income. 
Because its calculation is based on previous years’ tax return data not re- 
corded on tax files used in empirical studies, it is necessary to use iterative 
methods to construct the necessary information.”  Hence, some amount 
of programming is required to obtain a precise measure of the marginal 
36. See also Schwartz (1970a, p. 1270) for a discussion of this point. 
37. Studies accounting for the effect of  income averaging on marginal tax rates include 
Feldstein and Taylor 1976; Clotfelter 1980b; and Clotfelter and Steuerle 1981. 52  Contributions by Individuals 
tax rate.38  Such subtleties are usually forgotten, however, in studies using 
aggregated data. The usual approach in that case is to calculate the tax- 
able income and corresponding marginal tax rate for the average income 
value in a given income class.39 
A second complication in the calculation of  the price of contributions 
arises in the case of gifts of appreciated assets. As Schwartz (1970a) and 
Feldstein (1975a) have noted, the net cost of contributing a dollar of ap- 
preciated assets, when compared to present consumption, is 
(7)  Pa = 1 - m - m,g, 
where m is the marginal tax rate on ordinary income, m, is the tax rate on 
capital gains income, and g  is the asset’s ratio of capital gains to market 
value. Where the marginal tax rate is 50 percent on ordinary income and 
20 percent on capital gains and gain-to-value ratio is one-half (following 
the example given in section 2.2), Pa = 0.4, compared to a price of 0.5 for 
giving  If  the alternative to contributing assets is not immediate 
consumption, however, the price cannot be stated as simply as in (7). As 
Feldstein and Taylor (1976, p. 1203) discuss, the expected present value of 
the tax is reduced due to deferral and the possibility that the gain might 
never be realized and taxed as income to the individual. Thus the opportu- 
nity cost of giving an asset in the present is understated by (7) when there 
exists the option of holding the asset. In order to incorporate this reason- 
ing, they modify (7) by redefining g as the gain-to-value ratio multiplied 
by the present value of a dollar’s worth of tax ~ayment.~’  Since there are 
no data on either component of this variable, Feldstein (1975a), Feldstein 
and Clotfelter  (1976), and Feldstein and Taylor (1976) employ a maxi- 
38. Two other provisions affecting marginal tax rates are worth noting: the maximum tax 
on earned income and the minimum tax. Under the maximum tax, taxable income is allocat- 
ed to “earned” and “unearned” income, with the former facing a maximum rate of 50 per- 
cent and the latter “stacked” on top of the former. This allocation rule has the effect of re- 
ducing the top marginal tax rate below the statutory maximum of  70 percent. For further 
discussion of this provision, see Lindsey 1981. Chap. 3 discusses its effect on the price of 
contributions in 1980. 
The minimum tax, imposed in several forms in recent years, attempts to ensure that some 
minimum amount of tax is paid by high-income taxpayers. Legislation in 1982 required tax- 
payers to pay the greater of the normal tax or an alternative minimum tax, calculated as 20 
percent of  an alternative taxable income over an exemption. Since contributions were al- 
lowed as a deduction, the price of giving for the small group of taxpayers coming under this 
provision was 0.80. Whether this represented an increase or decrease is unclear, however, 
since many of these taxpayers paid little normal tax and thus faced low marginal tax rates to 
begin with. See U.S. Congress, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1982, pp. 7-9;  In- 
ternalRevenue Code 1982, sec. 55; and U.S. Congress 1982, sec. 201. 
39. See, for example, Feldstein 1975a. 
40. Note that the price of giving assets could be negative. Where the top marginal tax rate 
41. This could be modified to account for the possibility that no taxes will be paid by let- 
on ordinary income is 0.91, as it was in the 1950s, a value of g of 0.5 implies Pa = -  0.14. 
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mum-likelihood approach to select a value for g. The first two studies find 
that a ratio of 0.5 yields the best fit, while the third obtains both higher 
and lower values but assumes 0.5 for the purpose of estimation (Feldstein 
and Taylor 1976, pp. 1205-6). 
The ambiguities of defining the price of giving assets aside, it is not ob- 
vious how  that  price should be used in explaining contributions.  One 
could enter both the price of giving cash and the price of giving assets, 
but, as Feldstein and Taylor note (p. 1204), these measures would tend to 
be highly collinear. The approach adopted by  Feldstein (1975a) and in 
subsequent  studies is  to form a weighted  average of  both  prices,  the 
weights being the proportion of gifts in cash and in asset form by income 
class.42 
Because contributions are deductible in calculating state income taxes, 
state tax rates are another complicating feature in the calculation of  the 
net price of giving. In 1977, thirty-two states plus the District of Columbia 
had income taxes providing a deduction or a credit for contributions. For 
taxpayers  with  incomes of  $30,000, effective state marginal tax  rates 
ranged as high as 14 percent (Feenberg 1982, p. 11). These rates cannot 
simply be added to the federal rate, however, because of the interactions 
between state and federal taxes. Since state taxes as well as contributions 
are deductible in calculating the federal income tax, the inclusion of state 
income taxes makes the price of giving 
(8) 
where mf  and rn, are, respectively, the applicable federal and state margin- 
al income tax rates.43  The only indication in the published literature as to 
how much difference the inclusion of  state taxes makes is Feldstein and 
Taylor’s (1976, p. 1204n) comment on the similarity of estimates for 1970 
with and without  them. As Feenberg emphasizes, however, state taxes 
provide a source of variation in net prices that is quite independent of in- 
come. This independence takes on considerable importance in assessing 
the statistical properties of  estimated price effects in equations explaining 
contributions. This point is discussed in section 2.5 below. 
In considering the various tax provisions that determine the net price of 
giving, it becomes obvious that a precise determination of  the price re- 
quires individual data rich in tax information as well as data on state of 
residence. In the face of these interacting and sometimes complex tax pro- 
visions, one question that arises is whether individuals actually are cogni- 
P  = 1 - (mf(l-ms)  +‘rn,), 
42. As Feldstein  and Taylor point out (1976, p. 1204), using the actual breakdown between 
cash and noncash gifts actually made by an individual would introduce simultaneity into the 
definition of the price. One alternative  treatment to a weighted average is Schwartz’s (1970a. 
p. 1271) inclusion of capital gains in equations explaining contributions, but the ambiguity 
of this specification  makes it less desirable than the weighted average. 
43. See, for example, Reece 1979, p. 145. 54  Contributions by Individuals 
zant of the price of giving they actually face. To test taxpayers’ awareness 
of their marginal tax rates, Morgan, Dye, and Hybels (1977, p.  178) in- 
cluded a question in the Survey Research Center’s National Study of Phil- 
anthropy intended to measure the marginal tax perceived by respondents. 
According to the authors, only 21 percent of the taxpayers in the sample 
gave “conceivably correct’’ answers, defined as rates equal to or below the 
maximum rate for the taxpayer’s income and not lower than the minimum 
rate of  14 percent. Morgan, Dye, and Hybels conclude that this finding 
“casts doubt on the efficacy of deductibility as a major spur to charitable 
activity” (p. 231). For taxpayers with incomes over $30,000, however, the 
“conceivably correct” rate was over 43 percent (p. 178). In addition, the 
test for acceptable answers appears to have been quite strict. It is possible, 
for instance, that taxpayers’ rough estimates of their marginal tax rates 
are unbiased, but subject to variation. While individuals may guess too 
high or too low, they may be correct on average. Certainly at middle and 
upper incomes, the source of most charitable gifts, there is considerable 
sophistication about taxes and tax 
A final point relating to the calculation of the net price of  giving arises 
from the dependence of the price on the amount that is contributed, an at- 
tribute resulting from the nonlinearity of the budget set. The approach 
adopted by Feldstein (1  975a) and most succeeding studies was to calculate 
the price of giving the first dollar of contributions. Although this “first- 
dollar” price is clearly independent of  the contributions decision, it may 
be a poor measure of the marginal price in some cases. As table 2.10 above 
suggests, however, the first-dollar price is probably a very close approxi- 
mation of the marginal price in most cases. The correspondence between 
these two’price definitions is analyzed using a sample of taxpayers in sec- 
tion 2.5 below. 
Income 
Demand theory clearly implies that income is a determinant of demand 
(except in the unlikely case that the income elasticity is everywhere zero), 
but it is often less clear how, exactly, income comes into play. In terms of 
the simple model presented in section 2.3, disposable income would be the 
appropriate measure. Accordingly, most empirical studies define income 
as gross income less the federal income tax. (In order to make this an ex- 
ogenous measure of income, the tax is usually calculated as if no contribu- 
tions were made.) The federal-tax definition of  adjusted  gross income 
(AGI) is usually used for gross income because of  its easy availability, al- 
44.  A front-page “Tax Report” item in the Wallstreet Journal is illustrative: “Try to delay 
deductions, such as charitable gifts, from years when the alternative tax will kick in to years 
when you will pay the regular tax” (  Wallstreet Journal, “Tax Report,” 9 February 1983, p. 
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though it is flawed by the omission of important income sources, such as 
excluded and unrealized  capital  gains and interest  on state and local 
bonds. 
Two principal alternatives to the use of disposable income are perma- 
nent income and relative income. Developed by Friedman (1957), the the- 
ory of permanent income is based on the notion that a household’s con- 
sumption depends on its normal or “permanent” level of income, not on 
actual income received in any given year. If permanent income is the cor- 
rect income measure, the use of annual income will tend to result in a 
downward bias in the estimated-income coefficient due to the presence of 
the transitory component in annual income. Several studies of charitable 
giving include some measure of permanent income. Feldstein and Clot- 
felter (1976) used a two-year average of income to represent permanent in- 
come, and Clotfelter (1980b) employed a fitted value based on trend lines 
fitted for each individual. In both cases, a measure of the transitory com- 
ponent of income was also included.45 
The use of relative income is suggested by the theory of interdependent 
utility, discussed in section 2.3. For each income class in each year of  his 
sample, Schwartz (1970a) measured own income as the average disposable 
income for that class and other income as the average disposable income 
in excluded classes. His equations were estimated with and without the 
other-income variable (see section 2.5  below). Reflecting much the same 
relative income effect, other studies have included as explanatory varia- 
bles measures of the income distribution (Hochman and Rodgers 1973; 
Long and Settle 1979), the incidence of poverty (Dye 1978), and lower- 
quintile income (Reece 1979), all defined for the donor’s community. 
Following the simple consumer-demand model presented in section 2.3, 
empirical models of contributions implicitly assume that labor supply is 
fixed, and thus that gross income is exogenous. Menchik and Weisbrod 
(1981, p.  168) argue, however, that this assumption  is invalid,  leaving 
models of contributions misspecified. In order to account for the choice 
between work, volunteering, and other uses of  time, they argue for the 
inclusion of the net wage in models of monetary giving. While such a gen- 
eral model would certainly be desirable, currently available data sets do 
not offer the kind of information on wages for working individuals and 
shadow wages for nonworking individuals necessary to estimate a com- 
plete model. Instead, one must assume that the labor-supply effects of the 
charitable deduction are not of sufficient magnitude to create significant 
bias in estimates of the income elasticity of charitable giving. This as- 
sumption does not seem unreasonable. 
45. Other studies that use measures of permanent income, without a transitory compo- 
nent, are Schwartz 1970a and Reece 1979. 56  Contributions by Individuals 
Other Variables 
Besides price and income, variables have been included in models of 
giving in order to reflect the possible effects of personal, social, or demo- 
graphic characteristics of  donors.  Age has been  used and consistently 
found to be an important factor in explaining differences in personal giv- 
ing propensities.  Other personal variables that have been employed in- 
clude marital  status, wealth,  education,  dependents,  and  past  giving. 
Community characteristics include measures of relative income and pov- 
erty, as noted  above, as well  as measures of government programs in- 
tended to benefit potential recipients, the idea being that government pro- 
grams may reduce contributions. Like the relative-income hypothesis, the 
notion that public spending may crowd out private giving is an implica- 
tion of interdependent utility functions. 
2.4.2  Data and Estimation 
Table 2.12 presents  a  summary of  sixteen econometric analyses of 
charitable contributions in the United States. The studies utilize a variety 
of data sets, variables, and model specifications. The table gives informa- 
tion for each study on the data source, income limits, estimated price and 
income elasticities, variables other than price and income, and sample 
size. The elasticities shown are illustrative of basic estimates, but because 
these studies typically present estimates based on several different specifi- 
cations, the estimates shown are not intended as a complete summary of 
findings. 
Following at least thirty years of speculation as to the effect of the tax 
on giving, Taussig (1967) provided the first econometric study seeking to 
separate the effects of income and tax rate on giving. Using data on indi- 
vidual tax returns for 1962, Taussig found contributions generally to be 
insensitive  to variations  in  tax  rates.  For  income  classes  less  than 
$100,000, marginal tax rates were statistically insignificant. For classes 
above $100,000, tax rates had a small but significant effect, implying price 
elasticities ranging from -  0.04 to -  0.10. Estimated income elasticities, 
on the other hand, were large and statistically greater than 1 .O.  As for the 
price effect of the income tax, Taussig’s basic finding is that “the incentive 
effect of the deduction for charitable contributions is, in the aggregate, 
weak” (p. 16). This conclusion, of course, supported the speculations of 
Vickrey (1962) and others who had argued that any price effect on giving 
was bound to be small. 
Taussig’s conclusion has not been borne out, however, in subsequent 
empirical studies of taxes and giving, although much of his methodology 
has been adopted. Using aggregate data on contributions in several broad 
income categories between 1929 and 1966, Schwartz (1970a) found con- 
siderably larger price elasticities than those implied by  Taussig’s work. 
Schwartz’s estimates of the price elasticity ranged from -  0.41 to -  0.76. Table 2.12  Summary of  Econometric Studies of Individual Contributions 
Study 
Income Group  Estimated Elasticities  Other Explanatory  Sample 










Statistics of Income,  0-10 
time series, 1929-66 
10-100 
100 + 
Feldstein  Statistics of Income,  4-100 
1975a  pooled,  1948-68 
Feldstein and  Federal Reserve Board  1.721 + 




-  0.69 
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1,406 Table 2.12  (continued)  Summary of  Econometric Studies of  Individual Contributions 
Study 
Income Group  Estimated Elasticities  Other Explanatory  Sample 
Data Source  ($ thousands)  Price  Income  Variables  Size 
Feldstein and Taylor 
1976 
Tax file, 1962 
Tax file, 1970 
Boskin and Feldstein 
1978 
Dye 1978 
Abrams and Schmitz 
1978 
Reece 1979 
Long and Settle 1979 
Clotfelter 1980b 
National Study of 
Philanthropy,  1973 
National Study of 
Philanthropy,  1973 
Statistics of Income, 








(1972-73  shown) 
4+  -  -  1.09 
(0.03) 
(0.06) 
1-30  -  2.54 
4+  -  1.28 
(0.28) 
1-50  -  2.25 
(0.27) 
4-100  -  1.10 
(0.08) 
-  -  1.19b 
alld  -  2. lob 
0.76  Age, marital status  13,770 
0.70  15,291 
(0.02) 
(0.02) 








0.88b  537 
0.23  Relative income, age, 




2-50  -  1.34  0.67  Age, marital status, 
(AGI; 1970  (0.65)  (0.17)  dependents, lagged 
dollars)  short run  giving 
1.23 1 
3,456 Clotfelter and 
Steuerle 1981 
Feenberg 1982 
Reece and Zieschang 
1982 
Dennis, Rudney, and 
Wyscarver  1982 
Abrams and Schmitz 
1983 
Tax file,  1975 
Tax file, 1977; 10% 
subsample 
4+ 
up to 200 
BLS Consumer  - 
Expenditure Survey, 
1972-73 
Tax file.  1979  - 
Statistics of Income,  10+ 
1977, pooled by state 
-  0.49 
(0.23) 
-  1.27 
(0.05) 
-  1.23 
(0.42) 
-  0.91 
-  0.42 




0.78  Age, martial status,  26,397 
(0.02)  dependents 
0.44  Age, marital status,  7,102 
(0.14)  capital income 
1.31  Age, education  685 
1.23  45,880 
0.69  Transfers, poverty 
(0.06) 
357 
Sources: Taussig 1967, p. 6, table 1; Schwartz 1970a, p. 1276, table 2; Feldstein 1975a, p. 37, equation 2; Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976, p. 11, equation 6; 
Feldstein and Taylor 1976, p. 1206, equations 2.5 and 2.4; Boskin and Feldstein 1978, p. 352, equation 1; Dye 1978, p. 313, equation 3; Abrams and Schmitz 
1978, p. 35, model 3; Reece 1979, p.  146, equation 3; Long and Settle 1979, p. 14, table 2; Clotfelter 1980b, p. 333, equation 3.3; Clotfelter and Steuerle 
1981, p. 425, equation 3.1;  Feenberg 1982, p. 17, equation 7; Abrams and Schmitz 1983, table 2, equation 4; Reece and Zieschang 1982, p. 16; Dennis, 
Rudney, and Wyscarver  1982, p. 21, table 3. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
aSchwartz 1970a, p.  1280. 
bElasticities  calculated at means; standard errors not available or not appropriate. 
‘Taxpayers with negative disposable income deleted (Feenberg 1982, p. 16). 
dMarried households only. 60  Contributions by Individuals 
The income elasticities obtained by Schwartz, ranging from 0.28 to 0.92, 
were also strikingly different from Taussig's high values. Feldstein (1975a) 
used the same aggregate tax return data used by Schwartz, but formed a 
pooled time-series/cross-section  sample, thus increasing the variation in 
income  and  price.  The resulting  estimates in the  basic equation were 
-  1.24 for the price elasticity and 0.82 for the income elasticity. Three ad- 
ditional studies with others (Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976; Feldstein and 
Taylor 1976; Boskin and Feldstein 1977) using different samples of indi- 
vidual households yielded similarly large price elasticities ( -  1.15, -  1.09, 
-  1.28, and -  2.54). In the latter two studies, the price elasticities were 
significantly greater than one in absolute value, and the income elasticities 
were significantly less than one. 
Before reviewing other studies, it is useful to consider one policy impli- 
cation of these estimates of the price elasticity. Although the magnitude of 
the elasticity is obviously important in determining the effect of tax incen- 
tives, there is one critical value that is of particular, if partly symbolic im- 
portance. An elasticity of -  1 implies that the increased contributions re- 
ceived by charitable organizations as a result of the present deduction, for 
example, exactly offsets the loss in tax revenue to the Treasury. For price 
elasticities larger than one in absolute value, contributions increase by 
more as a result of the tax incentive than the amount of revenue the Trea- 
sury loses. This can be shown by considering a tax-revenue function such 
as T = 2 - sG, where 2  is the tax calculated without reference to contri- 
butions, s is the subsidy rate (equal to the marginal tax rate in the case of a 
deduction), and G is contributions. Holding 2 constant, the change in tax 
revenues is. 
(9)  dT = sdG - Gds 
= (P-1)dG + GdP 
(9' )  = PdG - dG  + Gde 
where the price of giving is P  =  1 - s. If the price elasticity of giving is 6, 
dG P = b dP G.  Substituting into (9')  yields 
(10)  dT = (l+b)GdP - dG. 
It the elasticity is -  1, dT =  -dG, that is, the change in tax revenues is 
equal and opposite to the change in contributions. If b < -  1, taxes will 
fall by less than the increase in giving brought about by a reduction in the 
price of giving.46 
46. This relationship holds for subsidies arising from tax credits or multiple deductions. 
Because of the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, however, the relationship does not hold ex- 
actly if taxpayers drop into lower tax brackets as the result of the deduction. Nor does the 
simple relationship hold for deductions or credits with floors. If there is a floor of  Q dollars 
and a subsidy rate of s, for example, the tax function becomes T = 2 - min[s(G-  Q), 01, 
reducing the revenue loss for a given price effect. This entire analysis ignores income effects. 61  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Subsequent studies have generally tended to support the finding of the 
Feldstein studies that the price elasticity is at least one in absolute value. It 
is interesting to note that the largest estimates of the price elasticity (Bos- 
kin and Feldstein  1977: -  2.54; Dye 1978: -  2.25; and Long and Settle 
1979: -  2.10) all are based on the same data set: the National Study of 
Philanthropy,  conducted by the Survey Research Center and the Census 
Department, covering  contributions made in  1973. Clotfelter  (1980b), 
Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981), Feenberg (1982), and Dennis, Rudney, and 
Wyscarver (1982) used data from tax files for individual itemizers, with 
sample sizes ranging from about 7000 to  over 45,000. Employing a variety 
of estimating techniques,  these studies found elasticities ranging from 
-0.42 to -  1.34.47  Much smaller samples taken from the 1972-73 Con- 
sumer Expenditure Survey, including  both itemizers and nonjJemizers, 
were analyzed by Reece (1979) and Reece and Zieschang (1982). Estimat- 
ed equations explaining deductible contributions yielded  elasticities of 
-  1.19 and -0.91.48  Finally, Abrams and Schmitz (1978; 1983) analyzed 
aggregate tax data on itemized contributions, obtaining price elasticities 
of -  1.10 and -  0.95. In general, econometric estimates based on  analyses 
of aggregate tax return data appear to be less reliable, being subject to 
considerable variation associated with changes in sample and model speci- 
fication. In particular, aggregate estimates appear to  be particularly sensi- 
tive to  the inclusion of low-income itemizers. Such taxpayers appear to  be 
unrepresentative of itemizers in general due to their unusually high ratio 
of itemized  deductions to income. As a result,  studies using aggregate 
data have excluded low-income returns in estimation. 
A number of,the estimated income elasticities in the studies since 1978 
fall in the 0.70 to  0.87 range found in the Feldstein studies, but several es- 
timates are well outside of this range. Studies using disaggregated tax re- 
turn data imply income elasticities ranging from a low of 0.44 (Feenberg 
1982) to a set of high values obtained by Dennis, Rudney, and Wyscarver 
(1982), illustrated in table 2.12 by a value of 1.23 calculated at the sample 
means.  Studies using survey data including nonitemizers  imply income 
elasticities ranging from 0.23, in a study including relative income as well 
(Long and Settle 1979), to 1.31 (Reece and Zieschang 1982). Abrams and 
Schmitz obtained elasticities of 0.69 and 0.81 using aggregate data. 
Besides price and income, the variable with the most consistent effect 
on contributions is age. Measured by a continuous variable or by one or 
more dichotomous variables, age is consistently associated  with higher 
levels of giving. Table 2.13 summarizes results from three studies that em- 
47. The latter estimate, based on equation 3.3 in Clotfelter 1980b, is the implied long-run 
price elasticity. The short-run elasticity corresponding to  the  first-year effect  of a price 
change is -0.49. See section 2.5.1 for a discussion of  this model. 
48. The measure of  contributions in Reece  1979, denoted CONTRIB, includes political 
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Table 2.13  Age Effects: Giving as a Percentage of  Under-35 Age Group 
Study  Data  35-54  55-64  65+ 
Feldstein and Clotfelter  Survey, 1962  113  128  163 
Boskin and Feldstein  Survey, 1973  158  212  236 
Clotfelter  Tax returns,  1972  144  182  196 
Sources: Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976, p. 8, equation 4; Boskin and Feldstein 1978, p. 352, 
equation  1;  Clotfelter  1980b, p. 329, equation 7. 
Note: Where the independent variable is the logarithm of contributions and oi is the 
coefficient for a given age dummy variable, the proportional  increase over the excluded 
group (under 35) is equal to 8. 
ployed the same age classifications. The numbers in the table express the 
ratio of contributions in the given class in the under-35 age group, holding 
constant income and other variables. The three studies imply, for exam- 
ple, that a taxpayer over 65 years of age will give from 63 to 136 percent 
more than an otherwise similar taxpayer under 35. Each of the three stud- 
ies, and other studies as well, suggest that giving increases monotonically 
with age. Reece (1979, p. 147) estimates that the elasticity of contributions 
with respect to age is 0.38. There are two possible interpretations of this 
result: either individuals give more generously as they get older or else 
younger cohorts are, and will remain, less generous than their parents and 
grandparents were. The former seems more likely but is  not proven by 
these findings. One other finding on age effects presented by  Clotfelter 
(1980b) suggests that, although giving appears to increase with age, it does 
so at a decreasing rate. Based on changes in the real level of contributions 
between 1970 and 1972, taxpayers in the 35-to-54 and 55-to-64 age brack- 
ets increased their contributions only 88 percent as rapidly as those under 
35, holding constant changes in income. Contributions by taxpayers over 
65 increased at only 82 percent the rate of the youngest group. 
Other explanatory variables have included marital status, wealth, and 
measures relating to the well-being of potential recipients. The estimated 
effects of the last of these three is presented below. Married households 
tend to give more than other similar households. The estimated percent- 
age difference exhibits a large range,  from 4 to 85 percent (Clotfelter 
1980b, p. 329, equation 7; Feenberg 1982, p. 17, equation 7). Because of 
the  important  demographic  differences between  married  couples  and 
other households, some studies have restricted the sample for estimation 
to under-65 married  household^.^^ Another possible determinant of giv- 
ing included in some studies is wealth. Probably the best measure is that 
49. See, for example, Feenberg 1982, p. 17. 63  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
contained in the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Financial Characteris- 
tics, used by Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976). In that study, wealth has an 
estimated elasticity of 0.10 (p.  11, equation 6). Dye (1978, p.  313) ob- 
tained an elasticity of 0.05 using the National Study of Philanthropy data. 
Using a proxy for financial wealth based on interest and dividend income, 
Feenberg (1982, p.  17) obtained an elasticity of 0.08. Whether these low 
elasticities are the result of poor measures of  wealth or indications that 
wealth influences bequests much more than lifetime giving is unclear. 
2.5  Behavioral and Econometric Issues in Empirical Studies 
Because they relate to the mechanisms by which tax policy affects giving 
or to the usefulness of alternative econometric techniques in inferring 
such effects, certain issues have taken on particular  importance in the 
econometric work on taxes and charity. This section distinguishes between 
issues of behavior and issues of econometrics. The distinction is necessar- 
ily artificial to some degree, however, since determination of behavioral 
relationships involve econometrics, and econometric issues have implica- 
tions for estimated behavioral parameters. The first part discusses impor- 
tant behavioral questions dealt with in these empirical studies, focusing 
almost entirely on the mechanism by which the income tax influences indi- 
vidual decisions to contribute. Such behavioral questions, in effect, have 
to do with exactly how the model of  individual giving is to be specified. 
The second section discusses econometric problems that arise in estimat- 
ing models of taxes and giving. Although these issues arise out of the the- 
ory of statistical inference, they have important implications for estimated 
behavioral relationships. 
2.5.1  Behavioral Issues 
This section discusses six issues that focus on the mechanism by which 
tax policy influences contributions. By  asking how tax policy affects giv- 
ing, each essentially questions the specification of  the basic econometric 
model of giving. In particular, each implicitly calls into question the as- 
sumption embodied in equation (5)  that there is one constant price elastic- 
ity and one income elasticity. 
Are Contributions to Diflerent Vpes  of Charities Subject to 
Diflerent Influences? 
Beyond the basic question of  deductibility and the specification of or- 
ganizations eligible for the limit based on 50 percent of  income, the tax 
law makes no distinction regarding types of charities supported. More- 
over, government data on the charitable deduction virtually never include 
information on the allocation of  gifts by type of charitable organization. 
Nevertheless, the pattern of gifts by donee type is of great importance in 64  Contributions by Individuals 
assessing changes in the structure of the nonprofit sector. Table 2.5 gives 
summary data on the pattern of giving to religion and several other major 
donee groups by income. The large income differences in the distribution 
of giving suggest the possibility that price and income effects may be dif- 
ferent by donee type.50 
Four empirical studies have estimated price and income effects for con- 
tributions to particular types of organizations, and their results are sum- 
marized in table 2.14. Two of the studies, by Feldstein (1975b) and Fisher 
(1977), rely on aggregate data for income classes and include only a few 
observations.  Accordingly, results of  these studies must be interpreted 
with caution. The other two studies, by Dye (1978) and Reece (1979), use 
survey data providing 1780 and 537 observations, respectiveby. While the 
larger sample sizes of the latter studies insure a much greater degree of sta- 
tistical reliability, the surveys themselves contain relatively few high-in- 
come households; hence the estimates may not be applicable at all income 
levels. ’ 
From the standpoint of sheer magnitude, religious gifts are the single 
most important category of individual contributions. The studies employ- 
ing disaggregated data on religious gifts both obtained larger price elastic- 
ities ( -  2.15 for Dye and -  1.60 for Reece) and smaller income elasticities 
(0.42 and 0.40, respectively) than the corresponding elasticities they ob- 
tained for aggregate contributions. The low income elasticity is not sur- 
prising, given the decline in the relative importance of religious gifts at 
higher incomes shown in table 2.5. The large price elasticity is unexpected, 
however, and appears to go against the notion that religious gifts are unaf- 
fected by tax considerations. The price elasticity obtained by  Feldstein 
(- 0.49) is quite different from these, however. Recognizing the problem 
posed by relying on seventeen observations, Feldstein estimated income 
elasticities by donee group, holding the price elasticity constant at his ba- 
sic estimated value of -  1.24. Under that specification, the implied in- 
come elasticity (0.38) is quite close to those obtained by Dye and Reece. 
In contrast to those for religious giving, the income elasticities estimat- 
ed for contributions to educational institutions are all greater than one, 
ranging in value from 1.22 to 2.31. The estimates of the price elasticity dif- 
fer markedly, however. While Feldstein and Fisher obtained estimates ex- 
ceeding two in absolute value, Reece found virtually no price response. 
Because  Reece’s  sample  includes  few  high-income  households-those 
most likely to make substantial gifts to colleges and universities-his  esti- 
50. As noted by Zellner (1977, pp. 1519-20), one implication of this would be that aggre- 
gate price and income elasticities would be weighted averages of  the elasticities applying to 
particular categories. 
51. Dye 1978 excludes the few households in the National Study of Philanthropy sample 
with incomes over $50,000 in 1973. Reece’s sample “consists almost entirely of households 
with annual incomes under $40,000” in 1972 and 1973 (Reece 1979, p.  149n). 65  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Table 2.14  Price and Income Elasticities of Giving, by Selected Donee Group 
Estimated Elasticities 
Type of Organization  Price  Income 
Religious organizations 
Feldstein  1975b 
Unconstrained  -  0.49  0.63 
(0.08)  (0.03) 
0.38 
(0.03) 
Dye  1978  -2.15  0.42 
Reece  1979  -  1.60  0.40 
Educational institutions 
Feldstein  1975b 
Constrained price elasticitya  - 
Unconstrained  -  2.23  1.22 
Constrained price elasticitya  -  1.54 
Fisher  1977  -2.31  2.31 
Reece  1979  -  0.08  1.64 
Helath and welfare organizations 
Feldstein  1975b 
(0.54)  (0.19) 
(0.91)  (0.24) 
Unconstrained  -  1.19  0.85 
(0.12)  (0.04) 
0.83 
(0.02) 
Reece 1979b  -  0.98  1.43 
Sources: Feldstein  1975b, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Individual 
Income Tax Returns; Fisher  1977, aggregate contributions by  income class in Michigan, 
1974-75;  Dye 1978: p. 315, National Study of Philanthropy; and Reece 1979, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1972-73. 
Note: Sample sizes were Feldstein (17); Fisher (18); Dye (1780); and Reece (537). 
aptice elasticity constrained to be -  1.24, the value estimated in Feldstein 1975a. 
bIncludes contributions deducted from pay plus “contributions to charities such as the 
United Fund, Red Cross, etc., which were not deducted from pay” (Reece 1979, pp. 144- 
145). 
Constrained price elasticitya  - 
mates must be interpreted with caution. Finally, Feldstein and Reece pre- 
sent comparable equations for contributions to health and welfare organi- 
zations.  The price elasticities are reasonably close (- 1.19 and -  0.98, 
respectively), but Reece’s estimate of the income elasticity (1.43) is con- 
siderably larger than Feldstein’s (0.85 and 0.83). 
A speculation offered by Taussig (1967, p. 19) is that contributions can 
be separated into two distinct categories-religious  and secular-that  re- 
spond differently to changes in income and price. While religious gifts are 
relatively unresponsive, elasticities for secular giving are larger. The find- 
ings summarized in table 2.14 provide partial support for Taussig’s hy- 
pothesis. The estimated income elasticities for religious gifts are certainly 66  Contributions by Individuals 
smaller than those for other categories. However, the evidence regarding 
the price elasticity does not, on the whole, support the notion that reli- 
gious giving is less price-sensitive than giving for other purposes. 
Does the Price Elasticity of Giving Vary by Income Class? 
Whether taxpayers in lower and middle income classes are as responsive 
to tax incentives as those in the upper brackets is a question of substantial 
importance for tax policy and one that has received a good deal of atten- 
tion. Not only are there large absolute differences in average contribu- 
tions over the income scale, but also the distribution of gifts by  donee 
classes varies by income. Since tax incentives typically differ as to their 
impact over the income distribution, the level and distribution of gifts re- 
sulting from each incentive are also likely to differ. This fact makes it im- 
portant to know if incentive effects differ by income level. One provision 
of the  1981 tax act-the  extension of the charitable deduction to non- 
itemizers-illustrates  the importance of information on how the incentive 
effect varies by income. Because the provision applies largely to low- and 
middle-income taxpayers, estimates of the revenue impact and the effect 
on contributions depend on what the price elasticity is in the lower part of 
the income scale.s2 
The prevailing view  among economists before  1975 appears to have 
been that there was little if any price sensitivity at lower incomes. Accord- 
ing to  Aaron (1972, p. 21 l), marginal tax rates applying to taxpayers mak- 
ing less than $1 5,000 were so low that they “cannot possibly be a major in- 
centive to charitable giving.”  Taussig’s (1967) study, of  course,  gave 
added weight to this notion by suggesting that tax rates had no effect on 
contributions by taxpayers with incomes under $100,000 (see table 2.12). 
As noted above, estimation problems cast doubt on these results. Other 
evidence by Taussig appeared to corroborate this conclusion, however. 
Comparing the marginal tax rates of big givers and small givers (as mea- 
sured by percentage of income contributed), he showed that only in the in- 
come classes above $100,000 did big givers have higher average tax rates 
than small givers (Taussig, 1967, p. 10). 
Schwartz’s (1970a) finding of significant price effects at all income lev- 
els-with  the elasticity actually falling with income-was  the first evi- 
dence contradicting the general view that there was little incentive effect in 
the lower income classes (see table 2.12). Table 2.15 summarizes subse- 
quent estimates of the price elasticity by income class, along with the cor- 
responding income elasticities. All of the studies included in the table used 
data from tax returns for itemizers, with all but Feldstein (1975a) relying 
on Treasury tax files for various years. Each study uses constant elasticity 
equations estimated separately by income class. In the results for incomes 
52. For a discussion of these issues, see U.S. Congress, Senate 1980. 67  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Table 2.15  Price and Income Elasticities by  Income Class Based on Separately 
Estimated Constant Elasticity Models 
Estimated Elasticitiesb 
Income Classa  Year  Source  Price  Income 
$4000-20,000  1962  [3] 
1970  [3] 
$4000- 10,000  1948-68  [2, eq. 61 
1975  [l] 
$10,000-20,Ooo  1948-68  [2, eq. 71 
1975  [l] 
$20,000-100,Ooo  1948-68  [2, eq. 8) 
$20,000-50,000  1962  [3] 
1970  [3] 
1975  [I] 
$50,000-100,000  1962  [3] 
1970  131 
1975  [l] 
$100,OOO or more  1948-68  [2, eq. 91 
1962  [3] 
1970  [3] 
1975  [I] 
-  3.67 (0.45) 
-  0.35 (0.52) 
-  1.80 (0.56) 
-0.95  (0.66) 
-  1.04 (0.76) 
-  1.35 (0.32) 
-  1.13 (0.25) 
-  0.97 (0.26) 
-0.85  (0.31) 
-1.66  (0.11) 
-  1.10 (0.19) 
-  1.12 (0.22) 
-  1.36 (0.14) 
-  0.29 (0.11) 
-  1.29 (0.04) 
-  1.74 (0.08) 


















Sources: [l]  Clotfelter and Steuerle 1981, p. 428, table 4; [2] Feldstein 1975a, pp. 89-90;  [3] 
Feldstein and Taylor  1976, p.  1213, table 3. 
ahcome  ranges for [2] are in 1967 constant dollars; other income ranges in current dollars. 
bStandard errors in parentheses. 
below $20,000 there is substantial variation in price-elasticity estimates, 
ranging from Feldstein and Taylor’s (1976) estimate of  -0.35  for their 
1970 sample to -  3.67 for their 1962 sample. Among the six estimates in 
this income class, only the largest permits rejection of the hypothesis that 
the elasticity is in fact greater than one in absolute value, and three are not 
significantly different from zero. In short, the price-elasticity estimates in 
this range lack precision. The main reason for this lack of precision ap- 
pears to be the very small degree of variation in the prices faced by lower- 
income taxpayers. Incomes appear to vary more than marginal tax rates in 
this range, resulting in much smaller standard errors for income terms. 
Therefore, although the median estimate of the price elasticity for tax- 
payers, below $20,000 is greater than one in absolute value, these studies 
leave considerable uncertainty regarding the price response among lower- 
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Among the equations estimated  for the  $20,000 to $50,000 income 
class, two of the three estimated price elasticities are less than one in abso- 
lute value, although all are significantly different from zero. The four 
equations covering incomes up to $100,000, however, all imply point esti- 
mates for the price elasticity that are greater than one in absolute value. In 
general, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients tend to decline 
with income level due to the increasing variation in price among taxpayers. 
As for the income elasticity estimates in the $20,000 to $100,000 class, five 
of the seven are in the range of 0.61 to 0.91. 
Four  sets  of  estimates  are available  in  the  highest  income class- 
$100,000 and above. The three studies using disaggregated tax return data 
yield large price elasticities, ranging from -  1.29  to -  1.78, and all are sig- 
nificantly different from -  1. The estimate based on aggregate data is 
quite small at -  0.29, but this can be explained by the inherent lack of pre- 
cision in calculating marginal tax rates for the highest income group when 
variations among taxpayers in deductions, type of income, and special tax 
provisions must be ignored. The income elasticities obtained in the three 
analyses of  disaggregated data are remarkably similar. Even though the 
standard errors are quite small, none is significantly different from 1.0. 
These separate estimates thus suggest a profile of taxpayers at the upper 
end of the income scale who are quite sensitive to tax-induced changes in 
price and to changes in after-tax income. 
Another way of  allowing for variations in price responsiveness is by es- 
timating more flexible forms of the basic giving equations, forms that al- 
low price and income elasticities to vary by income level. Estimates using 
three such flexible models for 1975 tax return data are shown in table 2.16. 
The first is a basic log-linear equation with an interaction term added. It 
takes the form: 
(14) 
The implied price elasticity is 
1nG = A  + ah  Y  + (b + cln Y)InP. 
which varies with income if  c is nonzero. In the equation for 1975, on 
which the first column is based, the estimate of  c is negative, implying that 
the price elasticity grows larger and more negative as income rises. When 
calculated at the mean values for each income class, the implied elasticity 
rises from -  0.38 in the $4,000 to 10,000 class to -  1.67 for incomes over 
$100,000. At income levels below $3119, the implied price elasticity is 
positive. Feldstein and Taylor (1976, p. 1213, equation 4.1) present a simi- 
lar equation with interaction term for 1970; the results also imply a price 
elasticity that rises with income. They reject this specification, however, 
because of  the implication of  positive price elasticities for incomes below 
$7455, stating that “the attempt to fix such a smooth and monotonic rela- 69  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Table 2.16  Income Variation in Price and Income Elasticities Implied by Single 
Equation Models 
Model 
Income Class  Interaction  Constant Income 
and Variable  Terma  Translogb  Elasticity 
$4,000 under  10,000 
Price 
Income 
$10,000 under 20,000 
Price 
Income 
$20,000 under 50,000 
Price 
Income 
$50,000  under  100,000 
Price 
Income 
$100,000 or more 
Price 
Income 












































-  1.39 
(0.12) 
C  - 
- 
-  1.26 
(0.07) 




C  - 
- 
-  1.51 
(0.06) 
C  - 
- 
Source: Clotfelter and Steuerle 1981, p. 428,  table 4. 
aElasticities calculated at class means, based on the estimated equation: 
In G  = 3.39  In  P  + 0.48  In  Y - 0.42  In  Y In  P + . . 
(0.26)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
’Elasticities calculated at class means, based on the estimated equation: 
In G  = 4.31 In P - 0.25 (In P)2 + 0.71 In  Y - 0.014 (In v2 
(0.63)  (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.013) 
-0.54  In  Y In P  + . 
(0.07) 
%ingle income elasticity estimated for all classes. 
tion between price and income is not appropriate. In order to fit the obser- 
vations well at high income levels, the functional form is forced to be in- 
appropriate at low levels” (p. 1213). In contrast, Brittain (1981, p. 443) 
argues that such “varying functions of  price seem entirely appropriate, 
given the strong relationship between P and Y.” 70  Contributions by Individuals 
An alternative functional form that does not constrain the price elastic- 
ity to vary smoothly with income is the translog form: 
(16) 
where the price elasticity is 
1nG = alnY  + (b + clnY + g1nP)lnP + h(lnU2, 
Elasticities based on an estimate of the translog form for 1975 are shown 
in table 2.15. They reveal much the same pattern as shown in model with a 
simple interaction term: the implied price elasticity rises in absolute value 
with income, although not quite as steeply. The range is from -  0.42 in the 
lowest income group to -  1.51 in the highest. The income elasticities, al- 
most identical to the interaction model, rise from 0.55 to 0.91-from  low- 
est to highest income class. 
The third single-equation model estimated for the 1975 data assumes a 
constant income elasticity but allows for separate estimates of the price 
elasticity by income class. The single income elasticity 0.78 corresponds to 
other income elasticities estimated using aggregate data. The pattern of 
estimated price elasticities in this model is strikingly different, however, in 
that low-income taxpayers  are shown to be most price sensitive. Price 
elasticities vary from  -2.17  in the lowest income class to -  1.51 in the 
highest. It is curious that all of these estimates are larger than the overall 
price-elasticity estimate of -  1.27 obtained for the 1975 sample reported 
in table 2.11; there is no easy explanation for the pattern of estimates since 
each was allowed to vary independently. 
A final single-equation model, estimated for the 1979 tax file, is Den- 
nis,  Rudney,  and  Wyscarver’s  (1982)  linear  expenditure  form.53  This 
model rejects not only the assumption that the income and price elastic- 
ities are the same for all income groups, but also the notion that they are 
constant at all income levels for a given individual. The model is based on 
the notion that utility depends on expenditures above some minimum 
amount in each spending category. One interpretation of the model is that 
the elasticities applying to “discretionary” income differ from those ap- 
plying at lower income levels. Estimates imply price elasticities that rise 
from about -  0.25 for taxpayers in the $20,000 to $30,000 income class to 
-  0.98 for taxpayers making more than $200,000. Corresponding income 
elasticities are 1.27 and 1.04. One apparent reason for the variation in 
elasticities over the income scale is the linear nature of the estimating 
model itself. That a linear form may be improper is strongly suggested by 
53.  Although the linear-expenditure  model is a system in name, in practice it implies the es- 
timation of a single equation when there are only two “goods.” See Dennis, Rudney, and 
Wyscarver 1982, p. 10. 71  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
one implication of the estimates: utility is a function of contributions over 
$495 and other expenditures over $17,354.54  Since a large proportion of 
taxpayers neither give the former nor make the latter, the validity of the 
linear form is suspect. 
The evidence summarized here provides no firm conclusion regarding 
the important issue of variation in the price elasticity by income level. The 
best evidence comes from separately estimated equations, and these esti- 
mates strongly suggest that price elasticities at upper incomes are larger 
than one in absolute value. Estimates for income groups between $20,000 
and $100,000 suggest elasticities around -  1, but these estimates are sub- 
ject to greater variability. For households with incomes below $20,000, 
the estimates based on the tax returns of itemizers provide variable and 
imprecise results. These estimates may be compared to those reported in 
table 2.12 applying largely to low- and middle-income taxpayers: -  2.54 
(Boskin and Feldstein  1977),  -2.25  (Dye  1978), -  1.19 (Reece 1979), 
-  1.34 (Clotfelter 1980b), and -  0.91 (Reece and Zieschang 1982). Differ- 
ences in estimation techniques aside, this set of  estimates leaves a very 
murky picture indeed regarding the price responsiveness of taxpayers at 
the lower end of  the income scale. In choosing which estimate of this 
group to rely on, one must choose between the precise data of  a self- 
selected group (in studies using tax data for itemizers) or the imprecise 
data of a randomly selected group (in surveys)-a  dilemma that does not 
apply at income levels where most people are itemizers. Some of the asso- 
ciated estimation problems are discussed below in part 2.5.2. In summa- 
rizing the variation in the price elasticity by income class, Zellner’s (1977, 
p. 1519) conclusion is apt: “Simply put, the price elasticities for different 
income groups have not been determined very precisely.” 
Is There an  Independent  “‘Itemization  Effect”? 
The basic model of contributions embodies the maintained assumption 
that a given change in the net price has the same effect whether it arises out 
of a change in marginal tax rate or a shift into or out of itemization status. 
An alternate view is that taxpayers respond quite differently to  a change in 
itemization, compared to  other changes in net price. As Dye (1978) notes, 
this explanation is consistent with the observation that, while many tax- 
payers do not know their marginal tax rates, they usually know if they 
itemize their deductions. Boskin and Feldstein (1977) and Dye provide 
tests of this possibility using the National Study of Philanthropy.  Dye 
shows that a dummy variable for itemization status performed as well in 
explanatory power as the conventional price term. Among the subsample 
of itemizers, the price term was not significant. From this he concludes 
54. The implied utility function is U  = .0275 In  (G -  495) + .9725 In  (X - 17,354), where 
G is contributions and X is other consumer expenditures. See Dennis, Rudney, and Wys- 
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that the “price effect is really an itemization effect misspecified as a con- 
stant elasticity” (p. 313). This assessment does not account, however, for 
the significant price effect estimated for samples made up exclusively of 
itemizers. 
To test for an independent itemization effect, Boskin and Feldstein (p. 
354) modified the ba:ic  equation by allowing the intercept to vary between 
itemizers and nonitemizers. The resulting estimates are not significantly 
different, giving no support for the existence of an independent itemiza- 
tion effect. This is the strongest test of the hypothesis, but because it relies 
on only one data set its negative conclusion should be interpreted  with 
caution. 
Are There Lags in Adjustment in Giving Behavior? 
Like other kinds of economic behavior, charitable giving may adjust in- 
completely to changes in price and income. Schwartz (1970a, p.  1271) 
notes a “possible desire on the part of donors to sustain a pattern of giv- 
ing.” Vickrey (1975, p.  157) observes “a tendency to establish a steady 
level of gross support, particularly for ongoing activities, that may persist 
for a considerable time in face of substantial changes in the tax incen- 
tives.,, And to the extent that donations are stimulated by solicitations, 
the intensity of which may depend on past giving, levels of donations may 
be relatively slow to change. Such behavior is suggested by Lamale and 
Clorety (1959, p. 1310), who note a tendency for retired people to give to 
religious organizations “at a level which reflects their giving habits before 
retirement. ” Similarly Morgan, Dye, and Hybels (1977) observe that tax- 
payers who had recently begun to itemize their deductions tended to give 
less than long-standing itemizers, as shown in table 2.17. By the same to- 
Table 2.17  Ratio of Actual to Average Giving by Itemization Status 
Ratio of Actual to Average Giving 
in Income Class (and Age Group for 
Incomes over $50,000) 
Itemization Status  Unadjusted  Adjusteda 
Never itemized  0.71  0.71 
Started itemizing during 
last five years  0.80  0.99 
Always itemized  1.42  1.37 
Stopped itemizing during 
last five years  0.88  0.79 
Source: Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1977, p.194, table 25. 
aAdjusted by regression for correlation with other variables. 73  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
ken, they found that taxpayers who had recently stopped itemizing gave 
more than taxpayers who had never itemized. 
Such behavior has important implications for the dynamics of charita- 
ble giving and for the usefulness of estimated coefficients for simulating 
the effects of tax policies. In general, the effects of  changes in tax policy 
will tend to be smaller in the short run than in the long run. It may not be 
appropriate, therefore, to apply estimates for cross-section equations in 
simulating the dynamic effects of tax changes. 
One model that explicitly recognizes the possibility of lags in adjust- 
ment is an incomplete-adjustment  model with an exponential coefficient 
of adjustment s: 
(18)  G//Go = (GI*/GO)" 
where GI  and GO  are levels of contributions in period 0 and 1 and GI*  is the 
long-run level of giving, determined by income, price, and other varia- 
bles: 
(19)  GI* = Ay"pb@". 
A value of s less than one implies that personal giving does not adjust 
completely in the first period after a tax-induced change in price or net in- 
come. Only when s is close to one will long-run equations be accurate in 
predicting short-run changes in giving. Combining equations (18) and (19) 
and taking logarithms yields the estimable equation: 
(20)  1nGI = C + saln Y + sblnP + sgX + (1-s)lnGo, 
where C is a coostant term. From this equation it is possible to infer the 
short-run income and price elasticities, SQ and sb, as well as the long-run 
elasticities a and b. 
Table 2.18 presents estimates based on equation (20) using panel data of 
U.S. taxpayers. Instrumental-variables estimation is used because of  the 
lagged dependent variable. Two of  the equations are based on a two-year 
adjustment period while the last is based on a one-year interval. The esti- 
mates of the adjustment coefficient imply that contributions do not adjust 
right away to the new long-run level as a result of changes in price and in- 
come. The coefficient of 0.609 implies, for example, that about 60 percent 
of the expected long-run change will occur in two years and about 84 per- 
cent in four years. Roughly the same adjustment process is implied by the 
one-year coefficient of  0.371. The estimated coefficients for 1968-70 and 
1972-73 imply long-run price and income elasticities on the order of  esti- 
mates from cross-section equations: -  1.5 and -  1.3 for price, respect- 
ively, and 0.7 for income. The equation for 1970-72 implies a higher in- 
come elasticity and a lower income elasticity. All of the estimates of the 
price elasticity in this study are subject to relatively large standard errors, 
however. These estimates appear to support other evidence that taxpayers Table 2.18  Price and Income Elasticities Based on Incomplete Adjustment Model 
Short Run  Long Runa  Coefficient of 
















-  1.549 
(0.51  1) 
-  0.450 
(0.559) 














Source: Clotfelter 1980b, p. 333, table 3. 
aApproximate long-run elasticities. See Clotfelter 1980b, p. 333, table 3. 
bShort-run elasticities and coefficients for 1972-73 sample refer to a one-year adjustment period and are thus not strictly comparable to parameters based on 
a two-year time period. 75  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
do not adjust to changes in tax policy immediately, resulting in smaller ef- 
fects in the short run than in the long run. 
What Is the Form of the Income Eflect? 
Another important question regarding the specification of the model of 
contributions concerns the form in which income enters in the determina- 
tion of giving. The simple theory of giving discussed in section 2.3 implies 
that an individual’s income will, in general, affect contributions. Income 
will have a positive effect if, as is thought to be the case, giving is a normal 
good. As is the case in demand analysis, income is normally measured net 
of taxes. Several alternatives have been suggested, however, for the use of 
current, or annual income as the basic measure of income. They include 
permanent income, discretionary income, and relative income. 
As noted in the discussion of  variable definitions, permanent income 
may be defined as an average of  annual incomes or as a “fitted” value 
based on an individual’s own personal trend income. Studies that use one 
of  these measures to compare estimates of income elasticities based on 
permanent and current income conclude that permanent income yields the 
larger elasticity. Feldstein and Clotfelter  (1976, p.  9), using a two-year 
average of  disposable income, found a permanent-income elasticity of 
0.87, compared to an elasticity of 0.84 for current income. The difference 
is well within the associated standard error, however. Cross-section equa- 
tions  for  1972 presented  by  Clotfelter  (1980b,  p.  329) show a larger, 
though still insignificant, difference between elasticities for current  dis- 
posable income and a permanent-income measure based on the trend in 
gross income. The elasticity for current net income is 0.53, compared to 
0.61 for permanent gross income. A measure of  the transitory income 
component, entered along with permanent income, also has a positive ef- 
fect on current contributions: if current exceeds permanent income by 10 
percent, the equation implies that contributions will rise by an additional 
1.7 percent. The available estimates, then, do not allow one to determine 
whether current or permanent income is the correct income measure. Sub- 
ject to the difficulties in measuring permanent income, both give similar 
results. The statistical significance of transitory income suggests, however, 
that current gifts are not wholly a function of permanent income. 
Related to the notion of transitory income, a second variant for the in- 
come effect emphasizes the role of  “discretionary” income. This explana- 
tion of giving implies that an individual’s propensity to contribute out of 
discretionary  income-income  over that  which  is  required  or already 
committed for other purposes-may  be quite different from the propensi- 
ty to contribute out of other income. A problem in testing this theory lies, 
of course, in identifying which income is “discretionary.” Dennis, Rud- 
ney, and Wyscarver (1982) present evidence consistent with this notion by 
estimating a function that allows such variation in giving propensities. 76  Contributions by Individuals 
Another test of this hypothesis is provided by my analysis (Clotfelter 
1980b) of changes in giving behavior over time. If increases in income are 
assumed largely to be increases in discretionary income, one implication 
of the discretionary-income  hypothesis is that contributions should be 
more responsive to  changes in income than the level of giving is to income. 
In three equations examining changes in contributions, I found (p. 331) 
elasticities associated with changes in the transitory component of income 
to  range from 0.23 to  0.37, lower than most estimated income elasticities. 
In addition, the individual's trend in income has a higher elasticity than 
the transitory component in two of  the three equations. While these esti- 
mates do not support the discretionary-income hypothesis, they represent 
only a rough test. In particular, the assumption that all changes in income 
represent changes in discretionary income is certainly open to question. 
A third hypothesis regarding the effect of income is that giving depends 
on the income of  others, including potential recipients, as well as the do- 
nor's own income. As Schwartz (1970a) shows, this hypothesis implies the 
inclusion either of relative income or the income of others along with own 
income. Where Y is own income and YO  is the income of others, the basic 
log-linear model can be written: 
(21)  G = APYo'P. 
This is equivalent to estimating 
(22)  G  = AY""(Y/Yo)-'P, 
where (  Y/Yo)  is a measure of relative income. As Schwartz notes, however, Y 
and (Y/Ya)  are highly correlated, making equation (21) a preferable form 
for estimation. The implications of relative and absolute income effects 
are quite different. A general increase in incomes will increase giving if 
own-income is the determining factor, but would not affect giving if rela- 
tive income is important. As Schwartz (1970a, p. 1274) suggests, the omis- 
sion of  relative income can lead to an overestimate of the own-income ef- 
fect because of  the correlation between the two income measures.  Such 
omission may of course bias the estimated price effect as well. Schwartz's 
estimates using models with and without relative income are shown in ta- 
ble 2.19.  Other income is measured  by average disposable income for 
those not in the sample being examined. For each income class the esti- 
mated elasticity for own income is smaller when other income is included 
in the equation, which is consistent with the possibility of bias due to  the 
omitted variable. Schwartz concludes from this that relative income is 
more important than own income (p. 1286), but these results seem too 
thin for a definitive conclusion. 
Other studies have obtained mixed results with regard to the effect of 
relative income on contributions. In an equation with no price variable, 
Hochman and Rodgers (1973) found that income dispersion had a posi- 77  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Table 2.19  Estimated  Elasticities for Price, Own Income,  and  Other Income, 
1929-66 Aggregate Data 
Income Class 
$0 under 10,OOO  $lO,OOO  under 
100,OOO  $1OO,OOO  or more 
Excluding other 
income 
Price  -  0.69  -  0.78a  -0.4Ia 
Own income  +  0.28  0.92a  0.45 
Including other 
income 
Price  -  0.85a  -  0.79a  -0.3Sa 
Own income  +0.19  0.76a  0.40a 
Other income  -  0.53a  -  0.43  -  0.38 
Source: Schwartz 1970a, p. 1276. 
Note: Estimates based on logarithmic specification. Other variables included trend, World 
War I1 dummy, dummy for years before standard deduction. N=  3 1. 
aCoefficients  with t-statistics greater than two in absolute value. 
tive effect on the level of contributions, thus supporting the interdepen- 
dent-utility hypothesis. Dye (1  978) reports a positive and significant effect 
for the percent poor in a donor’s community, also adding support for the 
hypothesis. Long and Settle (1979) obtained both positive and negative 
coefficients for.their relative-income variable, and Reece (1979) found no 
significant  effect  for  the  lower-quintile  family  income.  Abrams  and 
Schmitz (1983) found that contributions in 1979 increased with the per- 
centage of the state’s population in poverty. 
Schwartz argues that the omission of relative income will be more seri- 
ous in cross-section data, where relative income varies greatly (but col- 
linearly with absolute income). There is, unfortunately, no way to sepa- 
rate the own-income and relative-income components in most estimated 
income coefficients. When predicting the effects of income changes inde- 
pendent of changes in the incomes of others, this is of no practical impor- 
tance. It is only in predicting the effects of general increases in income on 
giving that this distinction is relevant. If, for example, relative income is a 
significant  component  underlying  income  elasticities  on cross-section 
data, such elasticities will tend to overstate the effect of secular increases 
in national income on giving.55 
55. For a general discussion of  the dynamic properties of cross-section estimates, see Kuh 
1959, p. 212. 78  Contributions by Individuals 
Does Government Spending  “Crowd Out ’’ Private Charity? 
If donors are concerned ultimately about the well-being of potential re- 
cipients, donations may be affected by government programs providing 
aid in the same way they might respond to increases in relative income. 
Donors may, in short, be able to see through the “veil” of  government 
programs to assess the need by charitable organizations for contributions. 
Abrams and Schmitz (1978) tested this hypothesis by adding to Feldstein’s 
(1975a) pooled data three alternative measures of expenditures on health, 
education, and welfare functions. Although the coefficients are of the ex- 
pected (negative) sign, the omission of  a trend variable leaves open the 
possibility that these variables merely reflect a previously estimated nega- 
tive trend effe~t.’~  In order to remove any trend effect from the measure 
of government expenditures, I estimated equations using a similar data set 
composed of  pooled time-series and cross-section observations spanning 
the period 1948 to 1980.s7  The estimates are presented in table 2.20. Equa- 
tion (2) is of  the form used by Abrams and Schmitz, including the loga- 
rithm of per capita federal expenditures on welfare and related functions 
Table 2.20  Regressions Explaining Logarithm of Contributions, with Measure of 
Federal Welfare Expenditures Included 




Log of  expenditures 
per capita 
Intercept 






-  0.070 
(0.250) 
R‘  .938 













-  0.00376 
(0.00546) 





Note:  The method of estimation was weighted least squares. The sample was restricted to 
classes with an average income of $4000 and above for the years 1948 to 1980, leaving 337 
observations. 
56. See Abrams and Schmitz 1978, p. 37, footnote 11, and Feldstein 1975a equation (3), p. 
57. A description of this sample is given in Appendix A. 
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but no trend. As in their study, the estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant. When the trend was included in addition, however, the gov- 
ernment-expenditure variable became insignificant, making it impossible 
to reject the hypothesis that factors other than crowding out were respon- 
sible for the previous  negative coefficient. This result casts doubt,  of 
course, on the original Abrams and Schmitz (1978) test of  crowding out. 
In another test,  Dye  (1978, p.  315) obtained insignificant and wrong- 
signed estimates using per capita local-government expenditures. It seems 
quite possible, however, that the redistributive element in local-govern- 
ment programs is lost in any measure of aggregate expenditures. Recently, 
Abrams and Schmitz (1983) have presented more convincing evidence of a 
crowding-out  effect.  Using  pooled  aggregate data for states,  they ob- 
tained a negative effect for state-government transfer payments. As with 
other estimations based on aggregate data, however, these results may be 
sensitive to variations in sample specification and thus should be inter- 
preted with caution. 
Are Individual Giving Levels Related to Each Other? 
Related to the notion of crowding out by government expenditures is 
the possibility that one individual’s donations are affected by the dona- 
tions made by others. One reason why individuals’ giving decisions may 
be mutually dependent arises out of the same interdependence of utility 
functions underlying the potential effect of government programs: if do- 
nors care about recipients’ well-being, contributions made by others can 
substitute for an individual’s own giving. As in the case of government 
crowding out, *this  reasoning suggests a negative relationship between an 
individual’s contributions and contributions by others. Another source of 
interdependence in giving, however, suggests an effect in the opposite di- 
rection. The example of  others’ giving behavior may stimulate one’s own 
giving, either by fueling the altruistic urge or by exerting peer pressure. 
Furthermore, it is possible that such influences are asymmetric, with gifts 
by those with more income affecting those with less income, but not vice 
versa. 
The net effect of these possible influences on the interaction of individ- 
ual giving is uncertain. However, the existence of a significant interaction 
would have important implications for the interpretation of estimated tax 
effects on contributions. For example, Steinberg (1982) discusses the in- 
terpretation of estimates of the price elasticity based on cross-section data 
when the true model of contributions is of the form: 
(23)  G, = f(f!  X Go), 
where G,  is an individual’s own contributions and GO  measures the contri- 
butions of others. The full effect of a change in price (holding income con- 80  Contributions by Individuals 
stant), for example, is composed of a direct price effect and an indirect ef- 
fect through the price effect on the contributions of  others: 
(24)  dGs  I  = a!,  + dG  -3  dG, 
dP  dy=o  dP  dG,  df? 
If giving by others is constant, as in a cross-section model, the estimated 
price effect corresponds to  the partial derivative dG,/dF!  However, econ- 
omywide changes in tax policy will affect the giving of others, and the to- 
tal price effect on giving will differ from the estimated effect if dG,/dGo is 
not  zero.  If  the  substitution  effect  of  others’  giving  dominates  and 
dG,/dGo c 0, the actual price effect will be smaller in absolute value than 
the estimated effect. If the peer effect dominates, the actual effect will be 
larger in absolute value. 
The most explicit examination of interactions in giving is presented by 
Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976). To measure the contributions of others, 
they added the variable 
where Gis  the mean giving for income classj, WJ  is a weight assigned to 
income class j  depending on individual i’s closeness in the income scale: 
WIJ  = (Y,/  %)+,  and the summation is carried out only for income classes 
at or  above an individual’s own class. The range of values for 4 that mini- 
mized the residual sum of squares was 10 or more, suggesting that giving 
only in an individual’s own income class matters. Furthermore, the coeffi- 
cient of g,:  was not significantly different from zero in an equation ex- 
plaining giving by individuals. This is by no means a definitive test of the 
interdependence  hypothesis,  however, because the interactive effects of 
giving would be expected to be much stronger at the local level than at the 
national level, as these comparisons are stated. 
2.5.2  Econometric Issues 
Because of the policy importance of empirical estimates of models of 
giving, considerable attention has been devoted to the econometric tech- 
niques researchers have used. This section discusses some of the questions 
that have been raised concerning econometric theory and technique. Ad- 
mittedly, the econometric issues discussed here have behavioral implica- 
tions, just as the issues of specification discussed in part 2.5.1 have direct 
implications for the econometric properties of estimated models. 
Ident$cation  of Price and Income Eflects 
Any tabulation of  average contributions by income shows a strong 
positive relationship.  Since marginal tax rates also rise with income, the 
positive correlation between contributions and income is a combination 
of an income effect and a price effect. The problem of identifying what 81  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
portion of the effect, if any, is due to the tax-defined price has been recog- 
nized by researchers for some time,’* but not until the application of mul- 
tiple-regression estimation techniques was there a reasonable prospect of 
disentangling the price and income effects. The problems caused by at- 
tempting to estimate the separate effects of  two highly correlated varia- 
bles-that  is, multicollinearity-are  well known. The most important re- 
sult  is  a  reduction  in  the  precision  with  which  either  effect  can  be 
estimated, indicated by relatively large standard errors for coefficients. 
The correlation between net income and price in econometric studies of 
contributions have, indeed, been large and negative.  s9 Despite this fact, 
estimated standard errors in the cross-section studies have generally not 
been excessive, especially when micro data have been used. 
The problem of separately identifying the price and income effects goes 
beyond mere multicollinearity, however. Because the tax rate is related by 
law to income, it is possible that conventional measures of multicollinear- 
ity are not sufficient. As Feldstein and Taylor (1976, p.  1208) note, “the 
problem of collinearity is limited to linear dependence. It is possible, how- 
ever, that the association between price and economic income implies a 
more fundamental problem of nonlinear under-identification.”  In other 
words, it might be impossible to identify price and income effects if the 
postulated structural model of  giving (usually log linear) is not correct. 
The relationship between price and net income is, of course, not even an 
exact nonlinear function; only taxable income and the marginal tax rate 
are exactly  linked,  and  only  then  within  the  several tax-filing-status 
groups. The dependence of price on net income is disturbed by variations 
in itemizationgtatus, deductions, and exemptions. Still, the relationship is 
uncomfortably close, and it is useful to examine ways in which price and 
net income vary independently. Besides itemization status, the two most 
important sources of  independent  variation  are differences in state in- 
come tax rates and changes in federal tax rates over time. 
Because state income tax rates differ and not  all states have income 
taxes, accounting for the state-tax treatment of contributions adds an im- 
portant source of independent variation to the price variable. As Feenberg 
(1982, p.  11, table 1) shows, the combination of  state and federal taxes 
caused the price of contributions for a hypothetical household making 
$15,000 in 1977 to vary from 0.80 to 0.70. At $30,000 the price varied 
from 0.68 to 0.X6“  To illustrate the degree of variation in price and net 
58. See, for example, Kahn 1960 and Vickrey 1962. 
59. For example, the correlation in the 1975 tax file of itemizers used by Clotfelter and 
Steuerle 1981 was - 0.39 between net income and price (P50)  and - 0.87 for the corresponding 
log values. The correlation was - 0.63 in Reece’s (1979, p. 145) sample of itemizers and noni- 
temizers.  The correlation for  time-series  data  may  be  quite  different,  as  illustrated by 
Schwartz’s (1970a, p. 1279) positive correlations, ranging from +0.62  to  +  0.95. 
60. Federal marginal tax rates for each income level were 0.2 and 0.32 (Tf)  and maximum 
state  subsidy  rates  (c)  were  0.12  and  0.14,  respectively.  The  combined  price  is 
1 -  c- Tf+  GTf. 82  Contributions by Individuals 
income that results from differences among individuals in deductions, ex- 
emptions, and state tax rates, table 2.21 shows the distribution of prices 
by net income for married taxpayers under 65 in 1970. Although any aver- 
age of the price certainly declines with net income, there is some degree of 
variation at each income level. 
Rather than using the price based directly on federal and state tax rates, 
Feenberg (1982) formed an instrument for the combined price in order to 
remove dependence of the price on personal characteristics such as mari- 
tal status or other deductions. Such dependence, he argues, would tend to 
result in omitted-variable bias if some characteristics are not included in 
the estimating equation. The instrument is based on calculations of state 
tax subsidy rates evaluated for fixed income and deductions. Using this 
procedure Feenberg obtained price-elasticity estimates close to those ob- 
tained in earlier studies, but his ordinary least squares estimates are un- 
usually small, making it difficult to be sure about the general effect of this 
estimation procedure. 
A second method of obtaining independent variation in the price vari- 
able is to calculate prices over periods in which  federal tax rates have 
changed. Effective tax rate schedules may be changed either by legislation 
or by inflation-induced bracket creep. Any use of contributions, tax, and 
income data over time-including  Schwartz’s (1  970a) time-series analysis 
and Feldstein’s (1975a) pooled analysis-would  capture some of this kind 
of independent variation. Feldstein and Taylor (1976) sought more spe- 
cifically to measure independent changes in the price of giving by aggre- 
gating data for 1962 and 1970 into classes with constant real incomes. For 
each of sixteen income classes they found that prices rose and contribu- 
tions fell between 1962 and 1970, implying arc elasticities with a median of 
-  1.92.61  In order  to account  for shifts  over time  unrelated  to price 
changes, they estimated equations of the form: 
(26)  ln(GI/Go) = a + bln(P,/Po)  + u, 
where  and  are average contributions for a Enstant-income class in 
the earlier and later year, respectively, and 6  and PI  are the corresponding 
average price terms, and u is an error term. Using data for 1962 and 1970, 
Feldstein and Taylor were able to take advantage of changes in tax law, in 
particular the 1964 reduction in tax rates, to capture independent changes 
in prices. As shown in table 2.22 this approach yielded price elasticities 
very  much  in  the  range  of  estimates using  disaggregated data:  from 
-  1.34, for unweighted regressions using the price that reflects gifts of as- 
sets and dropping the lowest three income classes, to -  1.58 for weighted 
regressions using all sixteen observations. However, when this same meth- 
--  __ 
61. Values for the highest income class were not counted for this calculation. Arc elastic- 
ities were calculated as (In G70 -  In G62)/(ln  40  -  In &).  See Feldstein and Taylor 1976, 





$1O,OOo-  $20,000-  $50,000-  $1 00,000- 
20,000  50,000  100,000  or More 
0.31  0  0  0  260 
0.3 1-0.37  0  0  0  2,508 
0.37-0.46  0  0  1,410  5,845 
0.46-0.6 1  0  0  6,045  2,099 
0.61-0.72  1  2,480  5,334  308 
0.72-0.75  0  5,302  769  37 
0.75-0.78  25 1  6,126  321  26 
0.78-0.81  2,716  2,414  109  20 
0.81-0.86  2,716  256  70  20 
0.86-1.00  709  55  58  37 
Source: Feldstein and Taylor 1976, p.  1209, table 1. 
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Table 2.22  Price Elasticities Based  on Changes in Contributions and  Price for 
Constant-Income  Classes, Selected Periods 
Specification and Sample  1962-70  1970-75  1962-75 
Price reflecting gifts of 




dropping bottom 3 classes 
Price reflecting gifts 
of cash 
Unweighted regressions 
-  1.39 
(0.19) 
-  1.58 
a  - 
1.34 
a  - 












-  0.63 
(0.38) 
-  0.97 
(0.29) 
-  0.84 
(0.26) 
Source:  1962-70: Feldstein and Taylor 1976, p. 1212; 1970-75 and 1962-75: Clotfelter and 
Steuerle 1981, p.434, table6. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
aNot reported. 
odology was applied using 1975 data (Clotfelter and Steuerle 1981), the 
implied elasticities were closer to zero and were generally subject to larger 
standard eirors. As table 2.22 shows, for example, the weighted regres- 
sion for 1970-75 implies an elasticity of -  1.09, and the corresponding re- 
gression for the entire 1962-75  period yields an estimate of -  0.63. The 
corresponding standard errors are 0.29 and 0.38. The large standard er- 
rors  for the  1970-75  period  may result from the comparatively small 
change in effective marginal tax schedules over the period. Rough as they 
are, the results in table 2.22 do lend general support for a negative price 
elasticity, but they add little to the precision of that estimate. 
Using a panel of taxpayer returns, I applied this same methodology to 
the giving of individuals over time. For any one individual, changes in the 
price of giving over time result from changes in personal variables-in- 
come, deductions, marital status-and  changes in the effective marginal 
tax schedule. The former source of variation does nothing to alleviate the 
potential identification problem, but the latter does. The basic logarith- 
mic form of the giving equation implies that the ratio of giving will be re- 
lated to the ratios of individual variables that change over time: 85  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
where A is a constant reflecting a time trend, c is a vector of coefficients, x 
is a vector of variables measuring changes in individual variables or char- 
acteristics for which growth rates in giving may differ, a and b are elastic- 
ities, and v is an error term. To the extent that omitted variables such as re- 
ligion  and  community  characteristics  remain  relatively constant  over 
time, a model such as (27) mitigates the possible bias resulting from their 
omission. After taking logarithms,  I estimated the model of  changes in 
giving for 4105 taxpayers who itemized deductions in 1968 and 1970, us- 
ing the Treasury’s Seven-Year Panel of Taxpayers. Because of new fea- 
tures embodied in the 1970 tax law (increased exemptions, a low-income 
allowance, and a significantly reduced tax surcharge), changes in the price 
of giving during this period were largely affected by exogenous influences, 
thus enhancing the opportunity to identify the price effect. Adding $10 to 
all reported giving yielded the following estimated equation: 
(28)  In (G+  10)70 - In (G+  lO)68  = 0.122 + 0.449 (In  Y70  - In  Ys~) 
(0.041)  (0.053) 
-0.388(1n  P~o  - In P68)  + 0.037 MRD + O.O065(D70 - &) 
(0.269)  (0.037)  (0.01  97) 
-  0.129(age 35-54)  - 0.183(age 55-64)  - 0.216(age 65 +), 
(0.029)  (0.037)  (0.053) 
R2  = 0.059, 
where contributions and net income are expressed in 1970 dollars, D is the 
number of dependents, and there are dummy variables for married cou- 
ples (MRD)  and age of  taxpayer.62 Both the implied income elasticity 
(0.449) and the price elasticity (- 0.388) are smaller than most estimates in 
cross-section studies. The standard error for the price term is especially 
large, implying a 95 percent confidence interval on the elasticity of 0.139 
to -0.915.  The age dummies suggest that rate of increase in giving drop 
with age. 
These estimates are similar to those based on changes for aggregate in- 
come classes in that the estimated price elasticities are smaller than typical 
cross-section estimates and the standard errors are relatively large. The 
similarity of these two sets of results strongly suggests that our knowledge 
about the price elasticity of giving is not as precise as most cross-section 
analysis would suggest. The lower point estimates implied by the analysis 
of changes in individual giving are roughly consistent with the aggregate 
elasticities presented in table 2.22, but there are several alternative expla- 
62. Price and income elasticities from this equation are presented in Clotfelter 1980b, p. 
331. table 2. 86  Contributions by Individuals 
nations for those estimates. First, the sample used for estimating the indi- 
vidual change model included only low- and middle-income itemizers, for 
whom the true price elasticity may be smaller in absolute value.63  Second, 
lags in the adjustment of giving behavior to changes in price and income 
would tend to show up as lower estimated elasticities. Other estimates of 
the  adjustment  coefficient suggest  that  the  two-year span covered  by 
equation (28) would not be long enough to accommodate most of the ad- 
justment in giving.64  Finally, the smaller point estimates implied by the 
change equations may result from an errors-in-variables problem arising 
from  the  failure  of  actual  changes  in  price to measure  “perceived” 
changes, where the latter is the correct variable. That smaller price elastic- 
ities are estimated in change equations for shorter intervals supports this 
hypothesis, but it is also consistent with the lagged-adjustment hypoth- 
esis. 
In summary, the statistical identification of the price and income effects 
on giving lies at the heart of  econometric work to assess the impact of tax 
policy on contributions. Tests to verify the effect of price involve maxi- 
mizing the amount of independent variation in tax rates. While they tend 
to leave more doubt about the precise price elasticity, these tests strongly 
support the existence of an independent tax-defined price effect on chari- 
table giving. 
Endogeneity of Tax  Variables 
Another  important  econometric  problem  encountered  in  empirical 
analysis of charitable contributions is that the policy variables of inter- 
est-price  and tax liability-are  dependent on the amount of  contribu- 
tions made. As figure 2.4 above shows, the budget set facing the house- 
hold typically is  nonlinear.  For itemizers, increased contributions may 
decrease the marginal tax rate and thus increase the price of giving at the 
margin. In addition, taxpayers whose contributions cause them to itemize 
their deductions experience an inframarginal decline in price. Similar ef- 
fects apply to total tax liability and thus to net income. Including actual 
values of price and income as explanatory variables in a regression ex- 
plaining contributions would lead to simultaneity bias, and resulting esti- 
mates would be inc~nsistent.~~  In order to obtain consistent estimates, the 
measure of  price must be made independent of the amount contributed. 
Three basic approaches have been used to  .achieve consistent results: use 
of a “first-dollar”  price of  giving, use of  instrumental variables for the 
63. See section 2.5.1 for a discussion of variations in the price elasticity. 
64. See section 2.5.1 for a discussion of a partial-adjustment model of giving. 
65. See Theil (1971), pp. 361-64) for a discussion of consistent estimates. See Feldstein 
1975a and Fedlstein and Taylor 1976 for discussions of this bias in models of chaiitable giv- 
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marginal price, and a nonlinear  procedure that accounts for the entire 
schedule of prices relevant to an individual. 
The first-dollar price is defined as the price applying to an individual’s 
first dollar of giving, and it corresponds to the slope of the budget set in 
figure 2.3 at the y-axis.66  Although it provides an exogenous measure of 
price, it differs from the marginal price for some taxpayers. Obviously, 
the greater the  difference, the less  reliable the first-dollar measure  of 
price. For the majority of taxpayers-those  who do not itemize-the  first- 
dollar price is exactly the marginal price. A difference is possible only for 
those who itemize deductions. The illustrative budget set displayed in ta- 
ble 2. ll  for an itemizer with average income in 1980 suggests that the con- 
tribution  required  to cause the first-dollar and marginal price to vary 
more than 10 percent would be very large-on  the order of seven times the 
average contribution for that class, or about $5860. 
A more direct test of the accuracy of the first-dollar price is given in ta- 
ble 2.23, which compares calculated prices for a random sample of item- 
izers in 1970. For the purpose of analyzing the pattern of prices, itemizers 
are divided into several classes. The most numerous group of itemizers are 
those who would owe tax and itemize their deductions whether or not they 
had charitable deductions. This, of course, is the usual case represented 
by a convex budget, such as that set shown in figure 2.3. In the 1970 sam- 
ple of itemizers, the first-dollar price was a very accurate measure of the 
marginal price. Whereas the average marginal price faced by this group 
was 0.782, the average first-dollar price was 0.779. Obviously the vast ma- 
jority of such taxpayers reach an equilibrium point on the first segment of 
their convex bu,dget set. Similarly, the first-dollar price and marginal price 
are within one percentage point for three other groups of itemizers: those 
who itemize even though it appears to be advantageous not to (line 3),67 
those whose returns are nontaxable in any case (line 4), and the few for 
whom contributions make the difference between nontax status and non- 
itemization (line 6).  For two groups of itemizers, however, the first-dollar 
price is not a very accurate measure of the marginal price. For the few tax- 
payers whose contributions reduce taxes to zero (line 5), the first-dollar 
price understates the marginal price. Much more important are those tax- 
payers who would not find it advantageous to itemize without their chari- 
table contributions (line 2). These taxpayers face nonconvex budget sets, 
as illustrated above in figure 2.7. Such borderline itemizers face a marginal 
price  (0.787) slightly higher  than  that  faced  by  itemizers in  group  1 
66. In the first-dollar approach, both price and income are calculated as if no contribu- 
tions are made. Because it is defined analogously, income is not discussed further in this sec- 
tion. 
67. These taxpayers may itemize because of state tax considerations or because of  require- 




I temizers  PI 
Taxable  returns 
1.  Excess itemized  deductions positive  with  or 
without contributions  88.1 
2. Excess itemized deductions positive with con- 
tributions, not without contributions (borderline 
itemizers)  6.7 
3.  Excess itemized deductions negative (itemiza- 
tion is not advantageous for federal taxes alone)  1.3 
Nontaxable returns 
4.  Nontaxable with or without contributions  3  .O 
5. Nontaxable  with  contributions,  but  taxable 
without  0.8 
6.  Nontaxable with contributions;  without con- 
tributions  taxable  and negative excess itemized 
deductions  0.0' 













~  0.003 
+  0.206 
-  0.002 
0.Ooo 
-0.128 
+  0.009 
Source: Seven-Year Panel of Taxpayers; see Clotfelter 1980b, p. 326, table 1. 
Note: Excess itemized deductions are defined as itemized deductions minus the greater of the standard deduction and the low-income allowance. 
aFor  a few taxpayers at the margin of itemization, the $10 of contributions used to calculated tax price was sufficient to change that status and thus result in a 
price not equal to one. 
bFor  a few taxpayers, actual tax liability was under a dollar; thus the marginal tax rate was a small positive number, although reported tax was zero. Most of 
these taxpayers had tax credits which most likely would have covered all tax liability. 
'Less  than 0.05. 89  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
(0.782), but their first-dollar price greatly overstates that marginal price 
(+  0.206). 
These calculations show that the first-dollar price of giving gives a very 
close approximation to the marginal price in most cases. The major error 
to which  the first-dollar measure is  susceptible is  overstatement of  the 
marginal price in the case of borderline itemizers. This has two important 
implications for econometric studies using a first-dollar measure of price. 
First, in samples containing both itemizers and nonitemizers, it is incor- 
rect to assume that the itemization decision is exogenous with respect to 
contributions. For itemizers who chose that status only by virtue of the 
contributions they made, the correct first-dollar price is one. Since these 
taxpayers are more likely to be relatively generous givers, assuming that 
their itemization is exogenous and assigning them a price less than one will 
impart a negative bias to the price elasticity. 
The effect of assuming that itemization is exogenous can be illustrated 
using the National Study of Philanthropy. Boskin and Feldstein (1977 and 
1978), like Dye (1978), took itemization status to be exogenous. Their esti- 
mated price elasticity of  -2.54,  shown in table 2.24,  is comparatively 
large. In order to examine the possible effect of their assumption, I reesti- 
Table 2.24  Alternative Treatment of Borderline Itemizers from the National Study 
of Philanthropy 
Reestimation 
Price = 1 
Replication  for 
Boskin-  of Boskin-  borderline  Borderline 
Feldstein  Feldstein  itemizers  Itemizers 
(eq. 1)  Equation  (N = 30)  Omitted 
Equation 
Log of net income 
Log of price 
Age 35-54 
Age 55-64 

















-  2.54 












































-  2.55 
-  2.40 
Source: Boskin and Feldstein 1977, p. 352. 
Note: Household incomes of between $lOOOand $30,000. Dependent variable is In (G + 10). 90  Contributions by Individuals 
mated their equation using the same data set. I calculated federal taxes 
and marginal tax rates from data on income, mortgage and house value, 
and exemptions. Other deductions were based on averages for each in- 
come class. Taxpayers were classified as borderline itemizers if their con- 
tributions made the difference between itemized deductions exceeding or 
being less than the applicable standard deduction for the household.68 
Equation (B) represents an attempt to replicate the Boskin-Feldstein sam- 
ple and specification. Probably because of differences in tax-calculation 
algorithms, the  samples and  estimates differ  slightly. The reestimated 
price elasticity assuming exogenous itemization status is -  2.69. The last 
two equations reflect two methods of mitigating the sample selection bias 
problem. In equation (C)  borderline itemizers were assigned the correct 
first-dollar price of one. The estimated price elasticity is -  2.20, a value 
significantly different from that in equation (B). Equation (D) was esti- 
mated without borderline itemizers in the sample. The estimates from this 
equation are not significantly different from those in the replication equa- 
tion, however. Because it includes the entire sample, the preferred equa- 
tion is (C), the estimates of which support the notion that the incorrect 
treatment of borderline itemizers leads to a negative bias in the price elas- 
ticity. The resulting estimate of this price elasticity is still quite large rela- 
tive to other empirical work on this question. 
The second implication of the problem for borderline itemizers is that 
there is a sample selection bias in any sample restricted to itemizers, such 
as samples of tax returns. Any sample of itemizers includes some taxpay- 
ers who are in the sample only because their  contributions were large 
enough to put their total deductions over the allowable standard amount. 
As an illustration of the sample-selection-bias problem, consider the true 
giving equation G = XB + u, where Xis  a vector of  explanatory varia- 
bles, B is a vector of coefficients, and u is an error term. For this model the 
conditional expectation of giving for the population is E(G;  I Xi)  = X;B. 
However, the comparable expectation for itemizers only is 
where I; is an individual’s possible itemized deductions and S; the maxi- 
mum of the standard deduction and the low-income allowance. For bor- 
derline itemizers, contributions will tend to be unusually large given their 
first-dollar price of  one due to the fact that such itemizers, in essence, are 
included in the sample by virtue of these relatively large contributions. At 
the same time, similar taxpayers making smaller contributions and thus 
choosing not to itemize would be excluded from the sample. The result of 
68. For a futher description of the sample and tax calculation method, see Appendix A. 
Out of the 1691 households included in table 2.24, equations B and C, 30 were classified as 
borderline itemizers. 91  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
including all itemizers would then be a positive correlation between the 
first-dollar price and the error term. This sample selection problem can be 
dealt with by techniques specifically designed for the purpose or by elimi- 
nating them from the sample.69 
A second approach to the problem of endogeneity in the tax variables is 
the use of instrumental variables. Feenberg’s (1  982) instrumental-varia- 
bles procedure using state tax rates, discussed above, is  one such ap- 
proach. Although it is open to the possibility of underidentification dis- 
cussed by Feenberg, a more conventional procedure would be simply to 
use the first-dollar price as an instrument for the true marginal price. 
When this approach was taken for a sample of itemized returns for 1970, 
the point estimates of the ordinary least squares and instrumental-varia- 
bles equations were quite close, which is consistent with the similarity of 
first-dollar and marginal prices suggested by table 2.21  .70 
A third approach to obtaining consistent estimates is a nonlinear tech- 
nique that embodies the nonlinearity of budget constraints. Following the 
work  of  Hausman  and others in estimating models of  labor supply,” 
Reece and Zieschang (1982) have estimated the effect of taxes on contri- 
butions using nonlinear  budget constraints. Their approach recognizes 
that the amount of contributions an individual makes depends on the en- 
tire budget set. When the individual is on any given segment of the set, he 
behaves just as if  he were facing a proportional income tax with the same 
rate, but with a credit added. This credit, or “rate structure premium,” 
arises from the fact that the actual tax differs from the hypothetical pro- 
portional tax, in that not all dollars are taxed at the same proportional 
rate.  72 Explicit ytility functions are then derived by applying Roy’s identi- 
ty to a simple linear demand function for giving. The utility-maximizing 
consumption point can then be found on the budget set. For convex bud- 
get sets, which apply to those who would itemize in any case, this is a fairly 
straightforward matter of comparing slopes. For nonconvex budget sets, 
including the case of  borderline itemizers, explicit utility calculations 
must be made. The estimation routine is a nonlinear maximum-likelihood 
method patterned after Hausman’s work. Although the complexity of this 
approach virtually dictates the use of a simplistic linear demand function, 
the approach deals explicitly with borderline itemizers and yields consis- 
tent estimates. Using a sample of 685 households from the Survey of Con- 
69. See Heckman 1979 for a discussion of  estimation in the presence of sample-selection 
bias. 
70. For a sample of 4492 itemizers, the ordinary-least-squares  estimates for the price and 
income elasticities were -1.68 (S.E. = 0.29) and 0.505 (S.E. = 0.063). The instrumental var- 
iables estimates were -1.72 (S.E. = 0.31) and 0.500 (S.E. = 0.064), respectively. 
71. See Hausman 1981 for a description of this work. 
72. Actual  net  income plus this rate-structure  premium  is  the amount comparable to 
Hausman’s “virtual income.” 92  Contributions by Individuals 
sumer Expenditures, Reece and Zieschang (1982) obtained estimates im- 
plying at mean values a price elasticity of -  0.91 and an income elasticity 
of  1.31. Compared to conventional  Tobit estimates obtained by Reece 
(1979) for a similar sample and dependent variable, the price elasticity for 
this nonlinear method is smaller in absolute value (- 0.91 compared to 
-  1.19), and the income elasticity is larger (1.31 compared to 0.88). Given 
the sensitivity of estimates in other models to sample and variable specifi- 
cations, it is impossible to determine how much of the difference is attrib- 
utable to the estimating techniques used and the differences in calculating 
elasticity values. 
Systematic Reporting Errors 
Estimates of aggregate contributions based on amounts reported by do- 
nors consistently exceed estimates based on gifts received by charitable or- 
ganizations, strongly suggesting that donors tend to overstate their contri- 
butions. Furthermore, there is some reason to believe that the tendency to 
report too much may vary by  itemization status and tax rate.  Vickrey 
(1962, p. 50), for example, suggests that itemizers may be more careful in 
recording gifts than nonitemizers. Such differences in memory or record 
keeping would bias survey findings and imply that at least part of ob- 
served differences in giving, such as those shown in table 2.9, are not at- 
tributable to a price response. Differences in tax rates may also affect re- 
porting. Since the tax benefit from overreporting is comparable to that 
obtained from actual increases in giving, it is possible that estimated price 
elasticities of giving embody an overreporting effect as well as an effect on 
actual  contribution^.'^ 
In order to explore this possibility, I estimated simple logarithmic equa- 
tions explaining reported contributions before and after IRS  Ta- 
ble 2.25 presents the estimated price and income elasticities for both mea- 
sures of contributions and four broad income classes. Although reported 
contributions in each income class are indeed higher than the amounts al- 
lowed by  auditors, the estimated price and income elasticities are quite 
close and well  within the corresponding  standard errors in every case. 
These results suggest that the tendency to overstate contributions does not 
rise with the marginal tax rate and that the use of reported contributions 
does not lead to systematic bias of the price effect. 
73. Elasticities in Reece 1979 are based on the percentage change in expected contribu- 
tions, while elasticities calculated by Reece and Zieschang 1982 are based on changes in giv- 
ing by a representative household. 
74. Kahn (1960, p. 67) suggests that taxpayers might have overstated gifts in the 1940s and 
1950s  due to high tax rates. Schwartz (1970a, p. 1269)  also notes the possibility of biased esti- 
mates from overreporting. 
75.1 am indebted to Eugene Steuerle for discussions on this topic. The data were taken 
from the 1969  Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program and were analyzed as a part of a 
Treasury Department contract on tax administration. For a description of the data, seeclot- 
felter 1983a. Table 2.25  Estimated Price and Income Elasticities Using Reported and Corrected Contributions 
Income Class 
Sample  Mean of Contributions  Price Elasticity  Income Elasticity 
Size  Reported  Corrected  Reported  Corrected  Reported  Corrected 
$3,000  to 20,000  21,789  227  21 1  0.06 
(0.37) 
Over $20,000 to 50,000  11,952  1,417  1,377  -  1.11 
(0.14) 
Over $50,000 to 100,000  4,336  4,869  4,720  -  1.43 
(0.12) 
(0.16) 
Over $100,000  1,020  49,351  47,890  -  1.60 
-  0.06 
(0.36) 
(0.14) 
-  1.42 
(0.12) 
(0.16) 
-  1.09 

















(0. I 1) 
Source: 1969 Taxpayer Measurement Compliance Program file. See Clotfelter 1983a for a description of the data set. 
Note: Other included variables were dummy variables for age, region, and marital status. Standard errors are in parentheses. 94  Contributions by Individuals 
Other Issues 
Several less significant issues have come up in the estimation of econo- 
metric models of giving. Three discussed briefly below are the modifica- 
tions of the logarithm of  giving, the problem of heteroskedasticity, and 
the omission of age in equations using aggregate data. In studies of indi- 
vidual contributions, observations of zero contributions present a special 
problem. Where such observations represent a sizable portion of the sam- 
ple, such as in Reece’s  (1979) sample, a technique that accounts for the 
zero constraint like Tobit is called for. Where only a small porportion of 
the sample gives nothing, ordinary least squares is appropriate, but the 
zero observations make it impossible to take logarithms directly. Trans- 
formations to allow a logarithmic form include adding $1 or $10 to all giv- 
ing amounts or setting a minimum contribution, based in part on conve- 
nience and in part on the idea that virtually everyone gives something. 
Because of the steepness of the logarithmic function in the vicinity of one, 
Boskin and Feldstein (1977) opted for adding $10. In other words, the 
constant  elasticity function  becomes less  plausible when  proportional 
changes in any variable become too large. Over the range of contributions 
values examined in econometric studies, even for samples dominated by 
low- and middle-income households, the differences between these alter- 
native forms do not appear to be large.76 
A second issue, raised by Hood, Martin, and Osberg (1977), is hetero- 
skedasticity in the errors in models using aggregated data. Because some 
observations in the samples used by Feldstein (1975a) and Abrams and 
Schmitz (1978), for example, are based on many more returns than others, 
the variance of the error term may not be constant. In order to obtain con- 
sistent  estimates,  it  is  necessary to apply  a  generalized  least-squares 
weighting of the observations. Another closely related problem, discussed 
by Feldstein (1975a), is the likelihood that itemizers with very low incomes 
are unusual.  His solution was to exclude observations with average in- 
comes below a given  In order to examine the sensitivity of esti- 
mates based on pooled aggregate data to adjustments such as these, a data 
set similar to that used by Feldstein was used to obtain new  estimate^.^^ 
76. Boskin and Feldstein (1977, pp.  1444-45) report price-elasticity estimates based on 
three forms of the dependent variable (standard errors shown in parentheses): In (G+ 10): 
- 2.405 (0.259); In (G10): -  2.506 (0.266); and In (GI): -  2.872 (0.371), where GI0 and GI 
are equal to the greater of reported giving and $10 and $1, respectively. 
77. In most equations Feldstein also excluded taxpayers with incomes over $1OO,OOO  on the 
basis that their economic incomes were poorly measured by adjusted gross income and that 
the opportunities of giving through other mechanisms such as trusts made it difficult to cal- 
culate their price of giving (Feldstein 1975a. p. 86). 
78. For a description of the data, see the Appendix A. 95  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
Equations of a basic logarithmic form were estimated weighted and un- 
weighted and for different income ranges. The weighting factor used in 
the weighted regressions was the square root of the number of taxpayers. 
The estimated price and income elasticities are shown in table 2.26. Of 
those shown, equation (E) is the same basic equation and sample as that 
employed by Feldstein (1975a), except that the income limits are  expressed 
in  1972 dollars rather than 1967 dollars.  The estimated elasticities are 
quite close: -  1.18 (compared to -  1.24) for price and 0.76 (compared to 
0.80) for income. For each pair of equations, the effect of weighting the 
observations is to decrease the income elasticity and increase the size of 
the price elasticity in absolute value. These changes are by far the greatest 
in equations (C) and (D). In contrast, the effect of limiting the sample at 
the lower level or at both the top and bottom is to reduce the absolute val- 
ue of  the price elasticity and to increase the estimated income elasticity. 
Except for equation (C), the estimates are reasonably well clustered. Yet 
the differences are still much greater than would be suggested by the rela- 
tively small estimated standard errors. Compared to estimates using indi- 
vidual data, these estimates appear less robust. Taken together, however, 
these results do appear to be consistent with other estimates. On the basis 
of  consistency of estimation and avoidance of bias by the inclusion of 
low-income itemizers, equations (D) and (F) would seem to be preferred. 
Table 2.26  Estimated Price and Income Elasticities of  Giving, Pooled Aggregate 
Data, 1948-80 
Estimates 
Equation, Sample and  Price  Income  Sample 
Estimation  Elasticity  Elasticity  Trend  Size 
Full sample  483 
(A) OLS  -  1.42  0.75  0.0093 
(0.07)  (0.03)  (0.0026) 
(0.07  (0.02)  (0.0013) 
(B) Weighted  -  1.69  0.5 1  -  0.0027 
Y > $4,000  393 
(C) OLS  -  0.73  1.16  -  0.0020 
(0.06)  (0.03)  (0.0021) 
(0.08)  (0.03)  (0.00  12) 
$100,000 > Y > $4000 
(E) OLS  -  1.18  0.76  -  0.005 1 
(0.21)  (0.02)  (0.0012) 
(F) Weighted  -  1.34  0.60  -  0.0078 
(0.08)  (0.02)  (0.00lO) 
(D) Weighted  -  1.42  0.67  -  0.0077 
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Not only do  they yield similar estimates, but their elasticities are also close 
to that implied by equation  (E), the basic equation used  by  Feldstein 
(  1  97 5a).  79 
2.6  Individual Giving in Foreign Countries 
An important step towards a more complete understanding of the effect 
of fiscal policies on charitable contributions is to extend the econometric 
analysis of giving beyond the United States. In so doing, it would be possi- 
ble to observe much wider variations in the tax treatment of contribu- 
tions, the level of  government services, and private institutional arrange- 
ments than is possible in analyzing one country alone. In this vien, the 
present section presents some available international comparisons of con- 
tributions by individuals. One fact that becomes quite clear is that avail- 
able data on charitable giving in other countries is much less complete 
than is the case for the United States. The present section deals in turn 
with certain institutional differences relevant to charitable giving among 
selected Western countries and then with econometric studies of individ- 
ual contributions for two countries. 
2.6.1 
For the purpose of  comparison, it is useful to summarize available in- 
formation on contributions and institutional characteristics for various 
countries. Attention is focused on three countries-Britain,  Canada, and 
the Federal Republic of  Germany-and  additional information on tax 
laws is presented for other countries. In Britain, the tax law allows deduc- 
tions for some charitable gifts, but the law differs in three notable respects 
from the U.S. treatment. First, the gifts must be in the form of a “deed of 
covenant,” whereby the taxpayer agrees to make payments to a charitable 
organization for at least seven years. Although the amount of the gift is 
Private Giving and Institutional Differences 
79. A final issue also relevant to the estimation of  contributions equations with aggregate 
data is the effect of  omitting age variables in estimating price and income elasticities. As 
shown by all of the work with individual data on contributions, age is an important influ- 
ence, with contributions rising steadily with age. In aggregate cross sections of giving, mea- 
sures of age have been omitted. Since age and income are strongly, albeit not linearly, related, 
the omission of  age in these equations could bias the income or price elasticities. In order to 
examine what, if any, effect this omission might have, I added a measure of the age distribu- 
tion of each income class to the pooled equation presented above. For the years 1968 to 1980, 
it was possible to measure the ratio of over-65 exemptions to taxpayers exemptions, giving 
the approximate proportion of adults over 65. When this measure was added to the aggre- 
gate giving equation, the income elasticity rose from 0.35 to 0.98 and the price elasticity fell 
in absolute value from -2.62 to -0.07, the latter being insignificant. The relatively small vari- 
ation in tax schedules tended to make the estimates from this sample quite unstable, howev- 
er, and it is thus hard to know what to make of this result. In addition, the studies of giving 
based on disaggregated data all include age variables without having a similar effect on the 
price elasticity. 97  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
fixed in advance, the taxpayer may retain some flexibility as to the ulti- 
mate recipient by directing contributions in the covenant to an umbrella 
organization such as the National Council on Social Services and later 
specifying the precise donee. Second, contributions have not always been 
deductible at the top marginal tax rate, as is the case in the United States. 
From 1946 to 1981 covenanted gifts were deductible only at the lower ba- 
sic tax rate, but they are now deductible at the surtax rate as well. Finally, 
the mechanics of the tax subsidy are more direct than in the United States, 
with the government sending checks directly to charities for the subsidy 
portion of contributions. The taxpayer deducts from his contribution the 
tax on the giyt, and the government pays to the charity the amount of that 
saving.8o 
The Canadian and German tax provisions both allow for a direct de- 
duction of contributions in calculating taxable income. Contributions are 
generally limited to 5 percent of  income in Germany and 20 percent in 
Canada, although there is no limit for some institutions in Canada (Bird 
and Bucovetsky 1976, especially pp. 16-23; PaquC 1982a, p. 3). The most 
notable differences from U.S. tax treatment occur in Germany. First, the 
German law allows contributions to some political organizations to be de- 
ducted. Second, members of organized religious bodies-the  vast major- 
ity in Germany-pay  a “church tax” calculated as a percentage of regular 
tax liability (Paque, 1982a). Needless to say, these differences would be 
expected to have an impact on the amount and composition of deductible 
contributions. 
Dedixticns for contributions are also allowed in Australia, France, and 
Japan. In Japap contributions to the Community Chest Society are de- 
ductible subject to both a floor and a percentage limitation. By contrast, 
contributions are generally not deductible in Italy and Sweden. One study 
of  tax differences across countries concluded that  “direct and indirect 
governmental support of the private philanthropic sector varies inversely 
with the involvement of  government itself in providing social services” 
(Arthur Andersen and Company 1977, p. 2975). 
The differences in tax law and the size of  government are reflected in 
differences in private giving among countries. In comparison to the United 
States, these countries have significantly lower levels of charitable giving 
and,  correspondingly,  less  dependence  on private  contributions.  Al- 
though differences in data and definitions make precise comparisons dif- 
ficult, it is possible to estimate giving as a percentage of personal income 
for the United States and three other countries. Personal contributions 
were about 0.2 percent of personal income in Britain in 1975. The compa- 
80. Descriptions of British tax law regarding contributions were taken from Owen 1964, 
pp. 337-38; Culyer, Wiseman, and Posnett 1976, pp. 36,4446;  Obler 1981, pp. 27-28; and 
correspondence by the author with E. B. Butler, Inland Revenue,  18 May 1982. 98  Contributions by Individuals 
rable figure in Canada for 1979 was about 0.5 percent. In Germany, non- 
religious giving in 1974 was 0.2 percent of gross income, and the church 
tax raised another 1.5 percent, for a total of 1.7 percent of income direct- 
ed toward charitable organizations. Contributions in the United States, in 
comparison, have been about 2 percent of personal income.*' At the same 
time, it is clear that government expenditures provide a large share of sup- 
port in these countries, whereas these functions are heavily dependent on 
private support in the United States. For example, the Canadian govern- 
ment provides the support for most of the country's Catholic parochial 
schools, and Canadian universities receive very little private support other 
than from fees (Bird and Bucovetsky 1976, p.  5). Similar1y;the  govern- 
ment provides substantial support in the areas of health, education, wel- 
fare, and the arts in Britain and Germany. In addition, the rise of govern- 
ment activity has been accompanied by declines in private giving. Falush 
(1977, p. 41) notes, for example, that the ratio of giving to personal in- 
come in Britain fell by half between 1934 and 1975, a period of substantial 
growth of government. Although their effects may not be precisely mea- 
surable, such differences in tax laws and government activity should be 
considered in evaluating econometric studies of giving in other countries. 
2.6.2  Econometric Analysis 
Two econometric studies of charitable giving have been undertaken for 
other countries, one for Canada and one for Germany. Both employed 
published data from tax returns to yield a pooled time-series/cross-sec- 
tion sample of class averages. Hood, Martin, and Osberg (1977) used an- 
nual data .on itemized deductions for various income classes covering the 
period 1968 to 1973. Taxable and nontaxable returns were entered sepa- 
rately, and taxpayer classes with incomes over $lOO,OOO  were omitted. 
With a sample of 248 observations, the resulting estimated equation is: 
(29)  In G =  -7.99  + 0.521 In  Y - 0.862 In P 
(0.757)  (0.038)  (0.201) 
+ 0.462 In K - 0.065 Trend - 0.810 RF, 
(0.05 1)  (0.050)  (0.222) 
R2 = 0.88, 
where G,  X and P are average values of contributions, net income, and 
price, as previously defined; K is the percentage of income from capital 
81. Sources for calculations were: Britain: Falush 1977, p. 331, which gives a ratio of 0.224 
percent for personal disposable income; Canada: Canada 1981, table 2, based on  total in- 
come of  $177,577 million and contributions of $885 million; Germany: Paqut 1982a, pp. 5, 
7 and unpublished information provided by Karl-Heinz Paque; and U.S.:  Giving  U.S.A. 
1981, p. 36, and U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1983, p. 185. For the U.S. the ratio of 
individual giving to personal income was 2.0 percent in 1970  and 1.9 percent in 1982. 99  Estimates of Effects of Taxes 
for the class; and RF is a dummy variable for the postreform years 1972 
and 1973. The estimated income elasticity is 0.52, somewhat below most 
estimates for the United States. The implied price elasticity, -  0.86, is also 
smaller than those implied by most studies, but the large standard error 
implies a 95 percent confidence interval of -  0.47 to -  1.26, making it im- 
possible to reject the hypothesis that the price elasticity is in fact -  1.** 
Considering the important differences between Canada and the United 
States in the sources of  support for certain nonprofit institutions, the 
similarity between these estimates and others obtained for the United 
States is striking. 
In a second econometric study, Paque (1982a) analyzed a similar pooled 
sample of contributions in the Federal Republic of Germany for five years 
between 1961 and 1974. After eliminating the six lowest income classes for 
each year, he obtained a sample of forty observations. Using weighted 
least squares, he estimated the equation (Paque  1982a, p.  16, table  1, 
equation 5): 
(30)  In  G = -  12.48 + 1.274 In  Y - 1.378 In P  + 0.308  YL, 
where YL is national income per employee. The implied income elasticity 
of 1.27 is much larger than most comparable estimates, and the price elas- 
ticity is somewhat larger than the median  of  estimates from previous 
work. PaquC’s explanation (p. 25) is that these differences reflect the vir- 
tual exclusion of religious giving from the German contributions data by 
virtue of the separate “church tax.” Given the lower income elasticity of 
religious giving obtained in the studies cited elsewhere in this chapter, this 
hypothesis seems quite reasonable. 
In a companion study Paque (1982b) examined the crowding-out hy- 
pothesis for Germany, using public-welfare expenditures as a measure of 
government activity. His results provide no evidence that crowding out 
had occurred, which is consistent with the findings presented in section 
2.4 for the pooled sample with a time trend. It is interesting that such tests 
for single countries reject the crowding-out hypothesis while, at the same 
time, there seems to be such a strong negative correlation between contri- 
butions and size of government across countries. 
(0.018)  (0.128)  (0.044) 
82. The authors appear to disregard this wide confidence range in contrasting their results 
with previous estimates in the range of “-1.15 to -1.17” and in stating that an elastic demand 
curve in the case of contributions “strains credulity” (Hood, Martin, and Osberg 1977, pp. 
660-61). 